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Résumé
L’éthique sert à étudier et améliorez les systèmes moraux et à guider des applications conformes
aux principes moraux encodés dans ces systèmes. La thèse proposée affirme que l’éthique pourrait être
conçue comme une discipline des sciences sociales qui inclut une réflexion de philosophie normative.
Selon cette conception, ‘l’éthique de la vertu’, avancée par Aristote, deviendrait une psychologie morale
scientifique qui guide l’éducation morale. L’éthique de la vertu devrait adopter une philosophie inspirée
des sciences humaines et devrait être nourrie avec des données scientifiques. Cependant, la plupart des
éthiciens rejettent l’existence de liens entre l’éthique de la vertu et la science. Un débat récent, au sujet
des traits de caractère, suggère une approche plus scientifique en éthique de la vertu. Ce débat examine le
concept de trait sur la base de recherches provenant de la psychologie sociale. Ces recherches sont
interprétées par plusieurs comme indiquant que l’éthique de la vertu doit être rejetée. D’autres par contre
trouvent que l’éthique de la vertu peut tenir compte des résultats en psychologie sociale sans changements
majeurs. Nous soutenons que le débat ne peut pas être résolu avec une conception traditionnelle de
l’éthique de la vertu. Seule une conception de scientifique qui incorpore des recherches de la psychologie
de la personnalité et les neurosciences cognitives peut accommoder les critiques des deux camps. Une
révision de l’éthique de la vertu suggère différents programmes de recherche et permet des applications
en dehors du cadre traditionnel de l’éducation morale.
Mots clés philosophie, éthique dc la vertu, sciences sociales, psychologie morale, trait de caractère,
philosophie des sciences humaines, psychologie sociale, psychologie de la personnalité, neurosciences
cognitives, éthique appliqué
Abstract
Ethics studies and improves moral systems and guides the application ofthe principles encoded
in these systems. It is advanced here that ethics could become a discipline ofthe social sciences that
includes a normative aspect. According to this conception, virtue ethics, advanced by Aristotle, is a
scientific moral psychology that guides moral education. As a science, virtue ethics should adopt a
phitosophy originating in the human sciences and incorporate new scientific data. However, most virtue
ethicists reject the existence of links between science and virtue ethics. A recent debate, surrounding
character traits, suggests that virtue ethics would benefit from a scientific approach. The debate examines
character traits in light of social psychological research. Some have interpreted this research as indicating
that virtue ethics should be rejected. Others argue that virtue ethics can accommodate social
psychological findings with few modifications. It is suggested that this debate cannot be resolvcd with a
traditional approach to virtue ethics. Only a scientific virtue ethics, one that incorporates personality
psychoLogy and cognitive neuroscience, can accommodate the criticisms of both camps. A revised virtue
ethics also suggests novel research programs and offers some applications outside the domain of moral
education.
Key words: Philosophy, Virtue Ethics, Social Science, Moral Psychology, Character Traits, Philosophy of
Human Sciences, Social Psychology, Personality Psychology, Cognitive Neuroscience, Applied Ethics
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Qu ‘est-ce que vertu ? Bienfaisance envers le prochain.
-Voltaire (1994 [1764]: 506)
Introduction
In a humanist moral system, religious or secular, morality is supposed to help
humanity (Kurtz 2000). Moral systems codify, and help people to achieve, good deeds.
These systems vaiy in their conceptual foundation and influence on social and private
behaviour. for example, Christian morals are linked to God, carry influence in Western
democracies, but are often ignored in private, especially as regards sexuality.
International moral codes are based on the declarations of the United Nations, are
regularly violated by nation states, and may yet have little influence on the behaviour of
individuals.
Ethics is the analysis of moral systems and the attempt to improve them. This
conjoins three efforts: research on moral systems, analysis of moral concepts, and the
design of moral principles to guide reality. Ethicists and social scientists study the
genesis, evolution, and practise ofmorality. The former set out to uncover moral
concepts (e.g. ‘evil’ in Judeo-Christian morality); the latter are driven by curiosity about
particular societies (e.g. morality in Victorian England).
Philosophers analyse moral concepts at a semantic and conceptual level; this
usually called meta-ethics. For example, the analysis of ‘duty’ will involve determining
the structure of a ‘duty’ sentence (e.g. an imperative) and a working definition ofthe
concept of duty (e.g. an obligation to behave in a certain way regardless of
circumstances).
2Normative ethics is the attempt to devise a set of supreme moral principles and
to apply these to concrete cases. Examples of moral principles: ‘Do unto others as you
would have others do to you’, ‘Obey God’, ‘Maximise pleasure’, ‘Do no harm’, ‘Do
whatever you want’, and ‘Help others live’. Three main systems have set out to refine
moral principles, each with its own focus. Consequentialism stresses the maximisation
ofparticular outcomes, e.g. happiness, deontology urges people to obey duties, e.g. to
tell the tmth, and virtue ethics encourages people to emulate exemplars, e.g. saints.
The truth-status of moral principles is a heated source ofdebate. Some advocate
that moral principles are a matter of convention (moral relativists), while others argue
that principles are absolute truths (absolutists). Part of the difficulty of surrounding
moral principles is that they involve humans; therefore moral principles have social,
psychological, and biological aspects. Just as there are both universal (e.g. most humans
desire affection and love) and relative (e.g. stone-age cultures requires fierce tribal
loyalty to survive) humans tmths, there are likely moral principles that have general,
and others local, truth and applicability.
The application of moral principles to real cases is best thought of as part of
technology1, i.e. a stage in the planning and design of artefacts and procedures (Bunge
2003). Technological applications change reality and ethical principles guide these
applications in moral directions (i.e. in order to help humanity). TraditionalÏy, applied
ethics tends toward philosophical, or ‘armchair’, teclmoÏogy. Reflection and careful
thought are used to design, and occasionally ‘thought experiments’ are used to test,
procedures guided by moral principles (e.g. ‘Do unto others as you would have others
‘This is technology in its larger sense, flot merely as the collection of artefacts, but “technology as
practice ... the organisation of work and people” (franklin 1999: 2).
3do to you’ guides the decision to have a ‘no hitting or fighting’ poiicy estabiished in an
elementary school). In contrast, formai technoiogy actively integrates scientific
knowiedge, experimentaily tests tecimological applications, and reanalyses guiding
principles in light of the resuits of application. Technologists often work in a ‘moraliy
biind’ fashion (e.g. engineers building the Worid’s Tailest Skyscraper); they aliow their
technological skills to be guided by the goals of their employers.
Ail technology is designed according to a particular conception ofmorality:
tacitly or expiicitiy. Parliaments are expiicitly designed to allow “the right of free and
fair debate, the right of the mai ority to decide, and the right of the minority to protest
and be protected” (Sturgis 2001: 1). In contrast, bombs are tacitly designed with the
moral aim of destroying bad peopie. Moral principles can have a beneficial, or
devastating, impact through their technological application. Unfortunately,
technological progress has ofien been misidentified with societal and moral progress
(Trigger 1998). In fact, societai progress only occurs when technology is used well; a
good use of a particular technologicai application can inciude the decision to abandon it.
Whereas ethics has a long explicit relationship with law, its expiicit influence on
other fieids, such as medicine and ecology, is more recent. As ethics interacts with
domains of scientific lurnwledge through formai technology, questions sunounding its
relationship to science have grown more insistent and difficuit to put aside. The
prevailing view is that ethics is autonomous from science; however, what this means is
unclear. Some argue that ethics is divorced from scientific experimentation; concepts
such as ‘good’ and ‘right’ cannot be studied with the scientific method (Harman 198$).
Ethics’ autonomy may resuit from its religious origins; moral systems under the yoke of
4science are ruined (Taylor 1989). Others have noted that science and ethics are parailel;
scientists assume that people are capable ofunderstanding nature, while ethicists
assume that people are capable ofgood (Hursthouse 1999).
I see the ‘parallel’ between ethics and science as a commonality. Ethics can be a
scientific cndeavour. Bioiogy assumes that certain things are ‘living’ and the
phiiosophy ofbioiogy works to define ‘life’. Likewise, ethics assumes that people are
‘good’ and meta-ethics works to define ‘good’. In my opinion, the case for ethics as a
science is progressively conservative, involving systematic reforms. No revolution is
required. As a science, ethics conserves its conventions (e.g. concepts such as ‘good’,
‘tmst’, ‘love’) and gains new opportunities (e.g. Do animais have anything anaiogous to
moral systems?). In marketing terms, scientific ethics is ‘everything you love about
ethics and more’. The notable exception to this maxim is religious ethics; the latter
joins the ranks ofcreationist biology, astrology, and parapsychology. Just as ethics can
proceed scientifically, so it can fail to be scientific.
I envision ethics as an interdisciplinary speciality of the human and social
sciences2. Research on the genesis of moral systems requires historical sciences, e.g.
anthropoiogy and biology. This includes the mother of ail ethicai questions: why did
humans developed morals in the first place? Sociology studies the evolution of moral
systems: for example, the interaction of artefacts and morality. Technological
innovations influence morals, e.g., birth-control changed the moral status ofsex, and
moral systems influence technological design, e.g. many religious moral systems
denounce genetic engineering as meddiing with the creations of God (Reiss &
Straughan 1996). Psychology studies individuals’ adherence to moral systems: for
5exampie, are people ‘sensible knaves’ who behave weil only when no one eise is
watching or are morals internaiized?
Meta-ethics is scientifically infomed in a manner analogous to other ‘meta
sciences’; for example, the phiiosophy of biology (e.g. Ruse 1988) and metapsychology
(e.g. Grigsby & Stevens 2000) are updated in light of new discoveries3. The concept of
rights (as in ‘human rights’) is increasingly extended to animais as researchers uncover
animais’ cognitive and emotional capacities. General principles, e.g., ‘Do no harm’, are
refined in light of application to concrete cases, e.g., medical treatments may require us
to do harm in the short term. Some principles, such as ‘Obey God’ are rejected by
scientific research, although many continue to believe in and be influenced by them. In
a scientific ethics, the tmth of moral principles is a matter of research and testing, flot
merely convention.
The strongest objection to the participation of science in secular ethics has
actuaily originated in the use of moral principies to guide technology. There is a logical
is-oughr gap: values do not foliow from facts (e.g., “I should eat” does not logicaliy
follow from “I am hungry”). Therefore, ‘what is’ cannot constrain ‘what shouid be’.
Strictly speaking, the ‘is-ought’ gap is an ethical-technological problem, not a
scientific one; science studies reality, technology changes it. The question is, ‘how can
we be sure that the technological changes are what ‘ought’ to be done?’ In a scientific
ethics, ‘oughts’ (e.g. we ought to promote education) are derived from supreme moral
principles (e.g. leam about the world). These latter are metaphysical hypotheses
assessed in light of the resuits oftheir application and based on their fit with other
2 Thornas Nagel, reluctantly I think, foresaw ethics in such a configuration: see Nagel 1979.
6theory systems; with analysis, certain principles (e.g. ‘Enjoy life’) may be refined (e.g.
‘Enjoy life without harming others’) or discarded. Scientific ethics assumes that some
principles wiIÏ prove objectively better in promoting the welfare ofhumanity.
Incidentally, although the fact our social reality can be improved seems obvious,
this idea is relatively new, dating back to the Renaissance and coming into force in the
Enlightenment (Trigger 199$). Previously, most believed that the world was doomed to
decay, or to endlessly cycle through decay and rebirth. As such, ‘what is’ was equated
with ‘what ought’; gods, or God, controlled the world and oversaw its destiny. The idea
that humans can improve the world arose amidst improved science (e.g. Galileo’s
physics), technology (e.g. sanitation), histoiy (e.g. Roman) and anthropology (e.g.
Native American cultures). These discoveries led Enlightenment thinkers (e.g. Hume
1969 [1739-40]) to revise meta-ethics, separating ‘what is’ from ‘what ought’.
The idea of ‘sociocultural evolution’ was later modified with a more general
thesis ofevolution (i.e. Darwin’s), whereby things change, regardless ofthe efforts of
humans (i.e., the world and its organisms will continue to evolve whether or not humans
exist). The meta-ethical, and general, implications of this second thesis are profound;
even if we do nothing, things will change. If ‘what is’ changes regardless of what we
do, then the task ofa humanist ethics is to do our best to choose courses of actions that
promote our continued existence. Perhaps evidence that certain ways of doing things
(i.e. certain moral principles realised in social planning) lead to a better world for
humanity will lead to an acceptance ofthe idea that certain means to cross the ‘is-ought’
A view of moral properties as ‘unscientific’ tvas previously applied to ‘life’ (vitalism) and ‘mmd’
(dualism). The latter became known as elnergentproperties; I suggest a similar fate for morals (see 1.4).
7gap are better than others4. By this une ofthought, nuclear war and environmental
degradation are the primary evils ofour age.
If solutions to a problem are unknown, science can be applied to discover
solutions. Applied science aims to solve practical problems, i.e. answer a ‘what’
question, such as ‘What are effective treatments for autism?’ In contrast, pure science
sets out to solve a conceptual problem, i.e. a ‘why’ question, such as ‘Why is there is
autism?’ Pure and applied science overlap; the difference between a practical and
conceptual problem is a matter of degree. If the science in a particular field is primitive,
answering ‘what’ will require ‘why’. However, while pure sciences are concemed with
understanding the world, applied science, like technology, is guided by moral
principles. For example, the application of nuclear physics to the design ofthe atomic
bomb was done under the assumption that defeating Nazi Germany was ‘good’. Most
involved soon realised that protecting the global population by dismantling the newly
created nuclear armaments was a greater good.
This thesis will discuss Aristotelian Virtue Ethics (VE). VE is best thought of as
an applied science ofpsychology, guided by the explicit moral principle that is, roughly
stated, ‘enjoy life and leam about the world’ (and involving the tacit principle ‘teach
others’). Many have noted that Aristotle’s moral principles remain good; and most have
noted that they require revision. Aristotie failed to state that ‘ail people deserve to enjoy
life and leam about the world’; be defended slavery and had a low opinion ofwomen.
Aristotle applies psychology to develop a program of moral education. He
remarks that for moral behaviour, “whether we form habits of one kind or another from
Or more precisely, we vi11 conceive of ethics as [he project of creating a better reality for humankind,
rather than aiming for what ‘ought’ to be.
8our very youth. . . makes a very great difference, or rather ail the difference” (EN 11 03b:
23-25). The research program within VE is novel enough to require an account of why
people behave (i.e. it is at the stage of a pure science), although its primary interest is
what makes people behave well. Modem psychology lias a beffer account of the former;
it remains in a nascent state regarding the latter. My suspicion is that both fields could
co-operate in researching moral psychology.
However, VE remains on the sidelines and fails to play a large role in researcli
into, or programs of moral education. This is because many virtue ethicists see VE as
philosophical moral psychology. The failure to embrace a scientific approacli has
damaging consequences for VE. Fear about dirtying the ‘sacred chambers ofethics’
with the muddy feet of science keeps VE in a primitive state. Obsolescence renders VE
difficuit to apply teclmologically, although VE lends itself to philosophical
appropriation as a ‘way to live one’s life’ (e.g. Vanier 2000). While armchair
applications can be beneficial, they are rarely tested and neyer institutionalised.
Furthermore, they are doomed to remain at a low level of sophistication; contrast a
home-remedy to open-heart surgery.
The promise and failure of VE is illustrated in a recent debate, which I shail cail
the character debate. Owen Flanagan (1991) initiated the debate by challenging the
autonomy of ethics vis-à-vis science. He argues that normative ethics should be
constrained by empiricai findings. My take is slightly different. I see the ethics as
‘autonomous’ in its focus on unique problems, e.g. good and cvii. Most sciences are
‘autonomous’ in this way (e.g. bioiogy studies life, geology, the Earth).
Ail Aristotie quotes are from: Aristotie. (1987) A New Aristotte Reader. (J.L. Ackrill, Ed.) Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press. (pp. 363-478).
9To empiricaliy constrain ethical theorising Flanagan introduces the Princtle of
Minimal PsychoÏogicaÏ Realism (PMPR). Ethicists must ensure that “when constmcting
a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and
behaviour prescribed are possible, or are perceived to be possible, for creatures like us”
(f lanagan 1991: 32). I understand the PMPR as a feature of effective technological
design. To the extent that technological projects are supposed to be currently realisable
they should involve what is psychologically possible (e.g. designing cunicula for moral
education in schools should recognise the intellectual capabilities of childrcn).
Although the PMPR is appropriate for any ethical theory, VE is a good test case
because of its reliance on psychological concepts, such as ‘emotion’ and ‘character
traits’ (CT). The latter are at the centre of the character debate. Roughly put, CT are
dispositions to behaviour (including ernotional behaviour) that form the basis ofvirtues
and vices: dispositions to good and cvii. Flanagan warns virtue ethicists that there are
problems facing VE both in its use of CT and its larger view of virtue. Flanagan seeks
to raise doubts about VE in others using social psychology, a branch ofpsychology that
studies social behaviour. Specifically, Flanagan draws on a scries of experiments and
findings known as situation ism. Situationism demonstrates that situations, not character
traits, determine behaviour; furthermore, situationist experiments reveal that normal
people can be made to bchavc in vicious ways. Perhaps virtue is a falsc hope.
Others have taken up fIanagan’s challenge (e.g. Dons 2002, Harman 1999a).
They note that situationism rebukes the ‘global’ view ofCT that is prcsent in VE,
wherein a trait invariably manifcsts in particular type ofbchaviour (e.g., a possessor of
an honest-trait is honest across contexts). VE makes predictions about CT and
‘o
situationism falsifies these predictions. Perhaps VE is better off replaced by a
‘situationist’ ethics. To these criticisms, virtue ethicists reply that situationism fails to
threaten VE. VE may manage to explain the findings of social psychology in a way that
leaves the theory relatively untouched (Athanassoulis 2000, Kupperman 2001,
Sreenivasan 2001). So stands the character debate. Yet, there are many problems with
the character debate and these problems illustrate the consequences of refusing a
scientific approach to cthics.
I’ll summarise the debate with an analogy drawn from politics. Flanagan’s role
is a whistle-blower; guided by his knowledge ofpsychology, he suspects that something
is rotten in the state ofVE. Dons and ilarman are radical activists; they wholeheartedly
advocate a massive reform ofVE- without care to preserve a system that may yet have
qualities and resources. The advocates ofVE are conservatives. They seek to dismiss
the problems facing VE and offer only token changes to existing policies. The problem
is that VE is both in bad shape and in need ofreform and VE is a sophisticated theory
with ample resources. The radicats fail to propose workable solutions and the
conservatives fail to address the decrepit state of their ethical theory. I position myseif
as a progressive reformer; I seek to keep the good in VE and to reform the bad.
I defend a scientific approach to VE as the best means ofreform and wiIl
dedicate much ofthis thesis to this project. I offer only a brief assessment ofthe
arguments of participants in the character debate; most mishandie psychology badly
enough to greatly reduce the worth of a painstaking examination of their arguments.
Only one participant thought to examine the status ofpsychological theories ofCT6 and
ail have neglectcd the ample body ofpsychological literature, dating from the 1970s
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onwards, rebuking situationism. Flanagan is knowledgeable enough about psychology
to restrict his criticism ofVE to viable paths, yet, lis goal is to raise problems rather
than offer solutions. In contrast, the ‘radicals’ misjudge social psychology’s place in
the larger field of personality psychology and thereby see social psychology as a viable
competitor rather than a sub-component. The ‘conservatives’ neglect the latent scientific
aspects ofAristotelian VE and disregard the need to incorporate new psychological
data. Both sides make some contributions that are implausible in light of the existing
body of psychological research.
In Chapter 1, I present the Aristotelian origins of VE (1 .1.) and a standard neo
Aristotelian view ofVE (1.2). The methodology (1.3) that characterises the latter is
criticised. I then present an altemate framework, derived from the human sciences (1.4).
Chapter 2 introduces ‘situationist’ social psychological research (2.1-2.5). Chapter 3
and 4 present the arguments ofthe critics and defenders ofVE. Chapter 5 presents
research on character traits (5.1) and some cognitive neuroscience findings that are
relevant to moral psychology (5.2). A concluding chapter speculates on research and
applied ethical programs for a revised VE.
In presenting the character debate, I hope to show that the adoption of a
scientific philosophical worldview is imperative in ethics and philosophy at large.
Although the) are philosophers who reject, and those who advocate, scientific
philosophy, larger number are, to paraphrase Michael Ruse, like King Canute, waiting
for tides of science to corne in (Ruse 1988: 81). This wait-and-see approach harms
academic philosophy and does disservice to the public.
6 Unfortunately, John Dons (2002) begins his examination with a misguided view of situationism intact.
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Academic philosophers share, rather than own, philosophy ami ethics.
Phulosophy is present in ail fields and ail fields stmggie with moral issues. The faiiure
ofphilosophers to become familiar with science strips them of their philosophicai
authority. Scientists and medical professionals are proving increasingly wiliing to take
over, and create, philosophical terrain: e.g. neuroethics (farah 2002).
In the social sciences, the need for scientific philosophy is more apparent;
obsoiete philosophies abound (e.g. existentialism, pragmatism, Marxism) and create a
confusing terrain for researchers. Confrision ieads to the creation, and toierance, ofbad
social programs. Our moral duty is to promote increased co-operation between
philosophy and the social sciences; I hope to use the character debate to illustrate some
of the benefits therein.
Chapter 1: Vïrtue Ethics
Aristotelian virtue ethics examines the psychological features that cause some
people to behave wetI. Aristotle’s reliance on principles ofdevelopmental biology gives
virtue ethics a framework that is somewhat compatible with modem psychology. In
contrast, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists see virtue ethics as a means to define morality
in terms ofwhat virtuous people characteristically do. Their interest in character is
coupled with a failure to elaborate on psychological structures that define character. The
neglect of character encouraged arnidst unscientific research methods. A human science
framework, one that welcomes scientific input, is suggested.
1.1 Virtue Ethics: Character, Ernotion, and Cognition
Questions surround scientific ethics even as its practice is ancient. Aristotie
applied science to study human moral behaviour- with an eye towards improving it. He
directed his studies “flot in order to know what excellence is, but in order to become
good”; becoming good requires us to “determine the nature of actions” (EN 1 103b: 27-
30). VE is only one part of Aristotle’s ethical approach; politics is also important.
Many have advocated VE (e.g. Hume, Socrates) but Aristotie is its patron. VE is
widely recognised for its focus on character: good people have good characters.
Ethicists distinguish VE from other ethical theories for its focus on moral psychology.
Paul Churchland (1998) contends that VE is the ethical theory most in tune with
scientific psychology, also known as cognitive neuroscience, the study of the brain and
the mmd. This is surprising, as Aristotelian psychology is ‘pre-neurological’; Aristotie
14
did flot see the brain as the organ ofthought. I speculate that the fit with modem
psychology resuits from the philosophical framework guiding VE, which is derived
from Aristotle’s study ofbiological development.
In the physical and natural sciences, Aristotelian influence endures in ‘general
science’, i.e. metaphysics, rather than in specific findings. Metaphysical hypotheses can
remain fertile for centuries or millennia. A notable example is the postulate that there is
a real world that can be studied. Aristotle’s blending of observation with theory was
later refined with the inclusion ofexperiment. His decision to link ethics to psychology
may be another legacy.
Experimental science couples metaphysical assumptions with operational
hypotheses. Metaphysical assumptions (e.g. there is a reality that humans can gradually
corne to know) are untestable7. In contrast, operational hypotheses are testable, albeit
oflen in principle rather than practice. Technological limitations, e.g. the current state of
teclmology, or historical limitations, i.e. events occuning in the past, may prevent
testing. These limitations are sometimes overcome. For example, recently developed
recording technologies are allowing neuroscientists to test 60-year-old neurological
hypotheses (Nicolelis & Ribeiro 2002) and improvements in the ability to study ancient
DNA (i.e. paleogenetics) are improving knowledge about organisms’ evolutionary past.
Scientific hypotheses are bounded by systems of hypotheses, i.e. theories.
Isolated assumptions (e.g. extra-sensory perception) that are at variance with other
theoretical systems, such as physics or biology, are unlikely to be given scientific
credence. A conspicuous problem in the character debate is that participants repeatedly
On the other hand, concordance with these assumptions proscribes the practice of science; conversely,
why study an illusion?
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offer ‘loose’ hypotheses that are at variance with psychological research. Loose
hypotheses seem plausible- in isolation- even as they violate well-established scientific
systems. WhiÏe implausible hypotheses cannot be rejected outright, these extraordinary
daims will require extraordinary justification.
Aristotle’s assumptions about moral behaviour were bounded by a larger
philosophical system including his research on developmental biology and embiyology.
Aristotle advocated epigeneticism; the development ofa germ (i.e. an egg) is influenced
both by its own composition and its environment (Mahner & Bunge 1997).
Consequently, Aristotie was aware that the properties of living things, including moral
properties, are a mix of ‘nature and nurture’; “we are adapted by nature to receive them,
and are made perfect by habit” (EN 1 103a: 23-25).
Metaphysical prescience aside, VE makes few clear operational hypotheses and
is clearly out-of-date. For example, Aristotle thought that psychological properties had
their origin in the heart. In my opinion, VE is best seen as a work in progress; its
concepts are rudimentary and require refinement. Aristotelian ethics avoided
refinement through its incorporation into Christian Theology and its subsequent
disappearance from secular philosophic consideration during the Enlightenment. The
popularity ofphilosophical linguistic analysis and the domination ofpositivisrn
hampered the retum of VE; psychology is unsuited to grammatical analysis and replete
with ‘inner variables’. Yet, VE regained its popularity. In the 20t11 century, the
association between Aristotie and orthodox Christianity undone, both Christian (e.g.
Anscombe 1981, Vanier 2000) and secular philosophers (e.g. McDowell 2003,
Nussbaum 1990) began to re-examine VE.
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Aristotie postulates that people differ in their moral behaviour. Virtuous people
are the most moral, vicious people, the least. Aristotie centres bis account on virtuous
people, implying that the application ofVE should aim to produce virtues. The prirnaiy
VE work, the Nichomachean Ethics, begins with an analysis of ‘good’. Virtuous people
strive for two kinds ofgood: “intellectual and moral” (EN 1103a: 14-15). Moral good is
eudaimonia, the flourishing ofhumanity, e.g. health and well-being, while intellectual
good leads to excellence in craft and the perfection of kriowledge about the universe.
Aristotie then presents the moral agent: a composite of character, emotion, and
practical wisdom. AIl psychological properties are constituted both vegetally (i.e.
features possessed by ‘lower forms of life’ such as plants and animals) and rationally
(i.e. features unique to humans). Social factors determine what we leam and biological
principles underlie that humans, of ail animais, can leam as much. As regards moral
progress, virtue theory is guardedly melliorist; the extent to which people can change is
constrained by their biological constitution and the society that they live in.
Character is expressed in traits (or states) and virtue is a character trait (CT) that
“makes aman good and which makes him do bis own work weil”(EN 1106a: 22-23).
Moral virtues predispose people to do good and moral vices dispose people to evil.
Likewise, intellectual virflies lead to excellence and intellectual vices to shoddiness. CT
are expressed at diffcrent ievels; only the mean between these levels is a virtue (e.g. the
excess of patience is complacency and its lack is anger). Aristotie lists the moral virtues
as: courage, temperance, generosity/liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, pride,
patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and righteous indignation (EN
Book II, Chapter 7).
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The relation of CI to other psychological properties, and to behaviour, is
difficuit to decipher. CI could be general dispositions that describe a person’s habituai
ernotional and cognitive pattems. for example, a trait for patience means that a person
is used to feeling cairn, used to waiting things out, and used to perceiving ways to act in
their environment in a patient fashion. If CI are meant this way, then traits incorporate
ail the characteristics that are needed to expiain the psychological properties of the
person that generate moral behaviour.
This interpretation is problematic because Aristotle separates CT from a direct
causai role in action and implies intermediaty psychological processes. While both
character and action involve voluntaiy decisions, “actions and states are not voluntary
in the sanie way” (EN 1 114n: 30-31). Traits are acquired through habit and practice,
i.e. over a long period, through practise analogous to “exercise and care” (EN li 14a:
34). Whatever a person is feeling or thinking when they act may bc influenced by traits,
but carmot be wliolly determined by them. Although a fit body allows a person to do
many things (e.g. run or ride a bike), fitness does flot determine exactly what a person
does in a particular situation. Likewise, a person with an ‘angry’ trait expresses their
anger in various ways.
The arnbiguity present in Aristotte’s account of traits foreshadows some
problems within the character debate. Owen flanagan (1991) notes that “trait ascription
can seem to impiy, but cannot on reflection be taken to irnply. . . a trait that is displayed
no matter what” (Flanagan 1991: 280). In contrast, other participants take Aristotelian
CT as ‘robust’ or ‘global’, whereby having a particular trait always leads to a particular
type ofbehaviour.
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I wonder if Aristotie uses traits merely as a conceptual means to distinguish one
person from one another, rather than as indicators of psychological structures in the
individual. For example, traits allow us to say that ‘she tends to be witty, while he is
ofien tactless’. CT indicate ‘individual differences’, yet reveal liUle about the role traits
play in behavioural generation. In other words, traits capture the fact that people differ;
yet traits explain Uttie about why people differ. Modem psychological research in CT
bas tended to follow this approach (see 5.1).
The other features of Aristotelian moral psychology are more straightforward.
Emotion aids and hinders virtuous behaviour. In general, emotions are helpful. People
experience pleasure when they do good acts and experience vicarious pleasure through
the good acts ofothers. Yet emotion may lead to akratic behaviour, i.e. against reason,
“under the influence of passions” (EN 1 147b: 14). For example, a person might be
nervous despite reasoning that there is nothing to fear; if their emotions hold sway they
may act badly, e.g. they cannot face sitting through an important lecture and decide to
go home.
Martha Nussbaum notes that insufficient emotions may also prevent right action,
placing a person in the predicament of “having knowledge in a sense and yet flot having
it” (EN 1 147a: 13-14 c.f. Nussbaum 1990). A person with insufficient, or incorrect,
emotions fails to understand moral situations. for example, if a person leams of a
military invasion through jargon such as ‘pre-dawn vertical insertion’ or ‘collateral
damage’, they may know at some level that the invasions have involved death, yet the
words fail to produce a truc understanding of what has happened.
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Psychologists increasingly view emotions as a form of cognitive activity, one
linked to bodily regulation, e.g. increasing heart rate, and to efficient learning, e.g.
people leam to avoid greatly feared stimuli quickly (e.g. Darnasio 2001, LeDoux 2002).
Interestingly, the phiasing of moral dilemmas to include the possibility ofbodily
exertion (e.g., pushing another person as opposed to pressing a button) tends to activate
emotional centres in the brain (Greene et aÏ. 2001). The activation, or failure to
activate, emotional centres can lead to different responses to otherwise similar moral
dilemma.
To take up the previous example, thinking abstractly about a military conflict
(e.g., ‘the two forces engaged each other’) may lead to the failure to feel anything,
whereas a realistic description (e.g. ‘one soldier had his legs blown off) will engage
one’s body in the thought. A strong feeling may focus the person on bodily matters (e.g.
preventing harm) whereas an abstract approach might focus analysis on abstract
concepts (e.g. the financial costs ofthe conftict).
People use ‘practical wisdom’, also known as phronesis, to teli them what to do
in a particular situation. Practical wisdom is gained through habit, which is in tum
guided by theoretical knowledge. If practical wisdom is gained habitualty, then radically
new situations may confound people (i.e. their old habits cannot appropriately guide
them in the new situation) and cause them to act poorly.
Practical wisdom is roughly equivalent to the contemporary notion of procedural
knowledge; this is knowledge that people eau act on yet find difficuit to explain
verbally (e.g. how to balance while riding a bicycle). People have a ‘sense’ ofhow to do
things, although explicating this sense may be beyond them. Psychologists have
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remarked on the relation ofprocedurai knowledge to moral behaviour (e.g. Grigsby &
Stevens 2000: 300-30 1). Moral teaching that occurs at a pureiy declarative level (e.g.
the memorisation of ruies of good behaviour without actual practise obeying them) may
fail to guide moral behaviour.
Aristotie synthesises bis account of moral psychology into four types ofpeople:
virtuous, continent, incontinent, and vicious. They ail aim for excellence, “a state
concemed with choice, lying in a mean relative to us” (EN: 1106b-1107a 36-37), and
strike with varying results. Virtuous people hit the mark, continent people are near the
mean, incontinent people shoot wide, and vicious people find themselves at the extreme.
The ways that peopte fail to act welI vary. for example, although both incontinent and
vicious people may succumb to akrasia, only the former wilÏ regret the fait, and while
both continent and virtuous people do what is right, continent people do so only afier
careful deliberation and emotional vacillation.
Aristotie views the developrnent of personality as mediated by an interaction of
‘nature’ and ‘nurture’. The important components ofpcrsonaiity include habits,
emotions, and practicai wisdorn. The relation of CT to behavioural generation is
somewhat unclear; in situ psychological mechanisms (e.g. choice) seem to mediate a
person’s behaviour. Aristotie predicts that continent and incontinent people are
‘unbalanced’ in certain components related to behaviour, whereas virtuous people
display an appropriate level. Vicious people may lack certain emotional structures
entirely. While VE offers an intriguing framework for moral psychology, its specifics
are lacking.
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1.2 Modem Virtue Ethics
Rosalind Hursthouse (1999) presents an overview ofneo-Aristoteiian VE.
Hursthouse sees unification in ethics on the horizon and stresses that ail ethical theories
have quaiities and that ail of them fail when caricatued by partisans. Although
Hursthouse acknowiedges that VE involves moral psychology, she does flot link VE to
scientific psychology.
Hursthouse states that unlike other ethical theories, no mies, codes, or
calculations exist in VE: virtue is uncodifiabie. While ethicai mies are hclpful as
guidelines, they require application and this mandates practical wisdom. People find
themselves in different situations and use practical wisdom to resolve these. VE
encourages people to ask themselves ‘Wbo should I be (in this situation)?’ with the goal
of emulating what a virtuous person would do.
I suspect that Hursthouse’s account would be better served by incorporating
neuropsychology. Her interest in ‘uncodifiability’ essentially relates to the complexity
of behaviourai generation; no simple system wiIl capture the factors that generate
behaviour, virtuous or otherwise (sec 1.4). Furthermore, by advocating that people
leam by emulation, cither by imagining someone doing something or by watching
someone directly, VE capitalises on motor leaming (i.e. emulating the movements and
bchaviour ofvirtuous people), as opposed to abstract mie leaming. Motor learning is
strongly linked to procedural knowledge (recali 1.1).
In an effort to ‘make peace’ with other ethical theories, Hursthouse maintains
that VE invokes a quality of consequentialist theories. Whereas consequentialisrn
advocates analysing consequences, VE notes that agents assess the moral outcome of
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their actions. Hursthouse cails this outcome the “remainder”; in VE, people are obliged
to deal with this remainder. When people act, they reflect upon their actions and are
emotionally affected. The repercussion ofa bad act may include remorse. Remorse
leads people who behave badly to make reparations for their failures.
I note that ‘remainders’ affect people unevenly. Firstly, some people are so
overwhelmed by remorse that they fail to make reparations. Secondly, certain brain
injuries scem to rob people ofthe ability to reftect on their actions or to feel guilt (e.g.
Anderson et al. 1999). I would also expect to witness non-pathological (i.e. occuning
within the bounds of normal development) cases of ‘remainder-neglect’ to manifest.
People might vary on their ability to feel or act on a ‘remainder’ due to educational
paffems or developmental deficits.
Hursthouse sees virtue as distinct from character traits. Virtue is synonymous
with human goodness and ineducible to “completely discrete, isolable character traits”
(Hursthouse 1999: 131). Virtue is “something that makes its possessor good. . .she gets
things right” (ibid. 13). The word that substitutes best for virtue, that “pick[sJ out
something that aiways makes its possessor good is ‘wisdom” (ibid: 13).
I question whether Hursthouse’s decision to unlink virtuc from CI justifies her
decision to ignore psychology entirely. Hursthouse attempts no further clarification of
the psychology of behavioural generation and fails to cite any psychological research in
her account of VE. She has noted that certain people are virtuous and lefi why and how
they manage to be virtuous unclear. In my opinion, Hursthouse abandons Aristotle’s
attempt to determine the “nature of actions” (EN 1 103b: 30).
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The disregard ofpsychology is typical of modem VE. Although virtuc ethicists
vaunt the uniqueness ofVE (e.g. Siote 2003 [1995]) and note the centrality ofcharacter
to VE (e.g. Watson 2003 [1990]), thcy neglect psychological research on character. for
example, Choosing Character by Jonathan Jacobs (2001) quotes no biological or
psychological studies ofcharacter; his interest is in the responsibility we should take if
our character is, for example, aggressive. To the extent that virtue ethicists are satisfied
with ‘armchair psychology’ that is uninformed by science, they have abandoned an
Aristotelian approach.
1.3 Approaches in Virtue Ethics
Both scepticism and mild interest towards scientific psychology characterise
philosophical research in VE. Scepticisrn originates from narrativist and
Wittgensteinian approaches, which place the analysis of narratives and common sense
above scientific research, at least as regards studying hurnans. Interest in science tends
to originate from an eclectic approach to gamering source material than an advocacy of
scientific philosophy per se.
The narrative approach to character, also known as the hermeneutic approach
(e.g. Taylor 1989), explores stories, myths, and poems. The narrative thesis is that a
personal point ofview, i.e. a subjective approach, best unveils character. Our lives arc
stories, and these stories reveal, richly and deeply, matters of ethical and phulosophical
importance (e.g. attachrnent, acceptance, rejection, and the uniqueness of each
individual). An objective approach risks ernptiness because it captures only the surface:
e.g. ‘the boy sat in front ofthe piano and began to cry’. The subjective approach delves
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deeper: e.g. ‘I sat there, terrified. The crowd’s eyes bumed into my skin, and the
piano’s keys, formerly inert bars of off-white, seemed to me now like the teeth of an
animal, ready to wound. I feit warm tears pour down my face...’
The project of exploring lives obliges nanativists to tum to literature and its
detailed accounts of lives and how they are lived. Nanativists are unconvinced of the
value ofthe scientific approacli as applied to psychology. Joel Kupperman notes that
while “[i]t would be very useful to have more scientific work on character. . . the moral
psychologies of .. . Aristotie, Confucius, and La Rochefoucauld would appear to be as
good as any we have” (Kupperman 1991: 172). Furtherrnore, literature has the
advantage of sheer volume; compared to psychology, “[ijiterature has had centuries of
headstart, and it lias been served by genius ofthe highest order” (Allport 1960: 6).
I have several reservations about narrative work. Its theoretical productivity is
low; nanativists generally refuse to posit laws or hypotheses. While many would argtie
that the formulation of laws in social science is impossible, some admit that “the role of
authorship and agency in the construction of psychosocial texts” (McAdams 1999: 495)
needs to be addressed at some point in the future. 0f relevance to the character debate
is that the exclusive reliance on literary and lay sources impedes discussion oftechnical
concepts (e.g. CT). There is also cause for suspicion regarding ‘the poverty of
objectivity’, because narrative views of science are ofien flawed.
The view that science must “square with experience, sensitively observed.. .[we
must] hold
... scientific accounts up against the best interpretative accounts of
behavior” (Nussbaum 2001: 119) is patently false. Science routinely studies
unobservable things (e.g. neurones within the brain) or things that contribute to, yet are
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only indirectly involved in, bchaviour (e.g. genetics). Equally ridiculous is the strict
bifurcation of the natural and human sciences, whereby psychology is a misguided
“ambition to model the saidy ofman on the natural sciences” (Taylor 1985: 1). This
ignores the long successful marnage of natural and human sciences in fields such as
gcography, to say nothing ofrecent successes.
In nanative work, scientists are often depicted as desiring the reduction of
everything to atomic components and of ignoring the ‘whole’. For these ‘reductionists’,
consciousness and morality are illusions. People think that their seif-interpretations are
important, while in fact they are illusory veils cast over the genuine rnechanisms
(Denneif 1988). Admittedly, reduction is a fruitful strategy- up to a point.
Reductionisrn lias dispelled ‘mystcty mongering’ approaches sucli as animism and
vitalism, whereby plienomena such as ‘life’ and ‘mmd’ are slated to remain enigmas.
Yet, radical reductionism does away with macrobiology, ecology, and social sciences.
Radical reductionism is increasingly regarded as unscientific in its disregard for
complex organisation, i.e. systems, botli in the physical (e.g. Goldenfeld & Kadanoff
1999) and social sciences (e.g. Trigger 1998: 150-151).
Things sliould be studied both in light of their sub-components and in terms of
their systernatic functioning. To take a trivial example, the application of science to
basebail couÏd legitimately examine physical (energy transference from bat to bali),
physiological (movement ofthe anri), psychological (perception of the bail), or societal
(the place ofbaseball in the society) levels of organisation. VE would lose nothing, and
gain a great deal, in adopting a scientific approach. An analysis of virtue could extend
to inctude its social, psychological, and biologicai aspects.
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Another research model with tenuous tics to science is modelled afier the work
ofthe later Wittgenstein. This philosophy examines everyday language usage;
Wittgcnstein proposed that language is a ‘toolbox’ that contains the ‘tools’ to solve
conceptual problems. Wittgenstein’s focus on how we speak, think, and reason has
inspired virtue ethicists to work on perception (e.g. McDowell 2003).
The ‘linguistic toolbox’ is helpful in detailing how words (e.g. ‘aggressive’,
‘kind’) are used in everyday speech. However, restricting research to the language
“we” use avoids imperceptible phenomena (e.g. quarks) and faits to develop concepts
much beyond a common-sense level. This will be illustrated in the section on CT
research in psychology (5.1), where a linguistic strategy became mired in difficulty.
Many virtue ethicists sec a kinship between Wittgenstein and Aristotie.
Hursthouse argues that Aristotelian psychology is a “philosophical psychology
.sympathetic to the later Wittgenstein” (Hursthouse 1999: 15-16). Both Wittgenstein
and Aristotie reject sharp distinctions between the rational and non-rational. Yet,
contra Hursthouse, these two philosophers arrive at this conclusion from totally
different approaches. Aristotelian psychology is tied to the biological study of
mammalian life. In contrast, Wittgenstein rejected scientific psychology and stated:
“there is no process in the brain conelated with associating or with
thinking”(Wittgenstein 1967: 106e).
A third approach to VE is mildly interested in science. Phulosophers with this
approach tend towards eclecticism, whereby science is just one more interesting source
of data, atongside history and pop-culture. Participants in the character debate generally
fait ilito ttiis group.
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I submit that scientific philosophy requires more than occasionally peeking
inside a science textbook. At the very least, it requires extensive background research,
in order to ‘stand on the shoulders ofgiants’ and properly survey a field and its
problems. Scientific philosophy also requires a scientific ontology, as defined by
theory-systems such as physics and biology, rather than ‘possible worlds’ metaphysics.
Background research and scienfific realism are crucial because although there are
countless reasonable, i.e. consistent and Iogical, ways to explain phenomena, many of
these are zinreatistic, i.e. have already been tested and rejected.
T accuse the participants in thecharacter debate of insufficient background
reading; some make daims that are either in direct variance with current research.
Interestingly, in their neglect ofresearch and other theoretical systems, philosophers are
merely repeating history. Many psychologists’ research on CT neglected
neuropsychology and violated tenets ofbiology (see e.g. 2.3).
While each character debate participant presents valuable arguments, separating
the gold from the dross will require a survey ofpsychological research on character
(5.1). 1 will set out a hurnan science framework- the bare minimum needed to
adequately integrate scientific psychology into ethics- and suggest that a revised VE be
built on this framework.
1.4 The Philosophy ofHuman Science
Although virtue ethicists poorly tended Aristotelian psychological science, its
original structure remains relatively accepting to modem psychology (Churciland
1998). A phulosophy derived from the ‘hurnan sciences’ (i.e. biological, psychological,
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and social) can rekindie VE’s scientific fire. A human science phiiosophy can also
frame a secular approacli to ethics, where moral properties belong in the conjunction of
biology, psychology, and society that define human beings.
Science espouses a systematic approach and a systemic worldview8; things
interact with each other in systems rather than as aggregates or unanalysable wholes.
Many systems have emergent properties, i.e. properties their components iack.
Emergent properties include life (possessed by a ccli, but not a celiular component, such
as a cell tvali or ribosome), solidity (a property ofa system ofmolecuies, but flot a
particular molecule), and behaviour (a property of an organism-environment system).
The philosophicai concept of emergence describes a property emerging from a system
(e.g. liquidity is the property ofa system ofmolecules at a particuiar energy level and
pressure), flot one thing emerging from inside another thing (e.g. a clown springing
from ajack-in-the-box). Systems/things may assemble out of other systems/things (e.g.,
a watch is assembled of simpler parts, which in tum are assembled from molecules).
Systems that arc complex (i.e. involve many types of components and
constituent factors) are also called ‘dynamic systems’. Ciassic examples of dynamic
systems are found in meteorology (i.e. weather). As the properties of systems are aitered
if a component is changed (Boudon & Bourricaud 2002), and complex systems have
many components that are subject to change, the expression ofproperties in a dynamic
system can vary greatly depending on starting conditions. Consequently, prediction
becomes difficuit.
8 Beware: The name for a systems approach varies. For example, Wilson (2000) calis it ‘holism’, while
Raymond Boudon uses the term ‘methodological individualism’ (e.g. Boudon 1984).
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Biological organisms are also complex systems. Biological properties emerge
and submerge depending on the interaction of systemic components (e.g., an overly
heated environment can lead to the Ioss of consciousness). A biological system’s
behaviour wili vary greatly depending on its initial state (e.g. Hebb 2002, Grigsby &
Stevens 2000); for exampie, a hungry mouse wiil behave differently from an exhausted
one.
In psychology, emergence iinks mental properties to the brain, so that mental
properties emerge from brain systems. An analogy to the relationship bctwcen mmd
and brain is as follows: as an organism ‘lives’, so a brain ‘minds’. Social systems also
have emergent properties: e.g. ‘relationships’ and ‘human rights’. ‘Social’ is
characterised as a system involving at least two creatures of the same species: for
humans, two or more peopie (Bunge 2003). Social systems aiso involve social
artefacts, such as schools, prisons and televisions. Moral properties form a special
subset of the properties of social systems of humans. Certain animais (e.g. primates)
may have some of the biological, psychological, and social properties that emerge as
rnorality.
Conceiving of morality in an emergent framework has more of ‘pruning’ effect,
i.e. expeliing certain conceptions ofmorality as implausible (e.g. theological, idealist),
than a constructive one. I suspect that emergence will discount narrative and
Wittgensteinian approaches (1.3), as the latter wouid ignore the technical concept of
emergencc itself Yet in itself, emergence provides no cicar moral system. Therefore,
neither neo-Aristotelian VE (1.2), nor Aristotle’s VE (1.1), nor most other ethical
30
systems, are barred from an ‘emergent’ refit. The rudiments of an ‘emergent’ VE wilI
be presented in the Conclusion.
What follows is an examination of the character debate in virtue ethics, first
through the ‘situationist’ debate within psychology and then the ‘character debate’
within phulosophy. I attempt to show that a failure to integrate a human science
philosophy and draw on several domains of psychological research dirninishes the
quality of the debates, without diminishing their importance.
Chapter 2: Social Psychology
Social psychology reveals both foui and fair in human behaviour. Many ofits
findings were used to argue that situations, flot character, guide behaviour; these
findings are dubbed ‘situationism’. Milgram’s (1974) experiments on ‘Obedience to
Authority’ demonstrate that a majority ofpeople will obey orders to inftict painful
shocks on a dissenting subject. In an analysis of experimental studies, Mischel (1968)
found that the stability of a person’s behaviour from one situation to the next is only
weakly corrclated. Similarly, Darley and Batson (1973) found that situational factors
predict ethicai behaviour. Despite the weakness of character-based explanations, people
aftributc behaviour to character. This pattem dubbed the fundamentai Attribution Enor
(Heider 1958, Ross 1977). Yet, ‘situationism’ only reveals the cornplexity of
personality and behavioural generation- flot its mechanisms. Neuropsychology is
needed to explain the generation of behaviour.
2.1 Social Psychology and the $tudy of Society
People behave in new ways in social situations: eyebrows raise and words flow,
gifts are exchanged and kisses are blown. Social behaviour is readily viewed as moral
behaviour: charity and murder, honesty and untruth. The variety and complexity of
social behaviour renders its study difficult. Societies are so complex that they rarely
show their ‘roots’ (Tocqueville 1986 [1836]). Social properties arise from the whole and
from individuals: for example, language has both individual and national properties.
Social properties are malleable and experimenters risk altering the behavioural patterns
oftheir subjects. Theories meant to reduce complexity often dangerously oversimplify;
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univalent explanations of society (e.g., societal transactions are solely ‘economic’,
‘power’, or ‘discourse’ based) are fruitful to the extent that they capture some aspects of
social systems and fail to the extent they ignore others. Those studying socicty need to
take care.
The field of social psychology studies the behaviours of individuals in social
systems and through interactions with social artefacts. This covers both ‘extemal’ (e.g.
body language) and ‘internai’ (e.g. thoughts and attributions) behaviour. Examples of
social psychology include the study of behaviour of individuals working in teams and
the shopping behaviour of people exposed to music.
Whereas social psychology is a discipline proper, personality psychology is
interdisciplinary. Personality psychology must incorporate social,. clinical, and
neuropsychological researcli. Restricting study to a certain system is often practical;
ignoring other systems entirely leads to poor theory. To foreshadow the fate of the
situationist argument that is at the centre of the character debate, social psychology is
unable to produce theories of human functioning divorced from input from other
psychological disciplines.
Social psychologists uncover how social systems affect people. This could
involve biological characteristics common to all people (e.g. blushing when
embarrassed) or cuïturally derived education specific to certain people (e.g. people who
have leamed to rise during the national anthem). The title of the principal journal of
social psychology, the Journal ofFersonaÏity and Social PsychoÏo, reflects its
participation in the larger project of personality psychology. This is noteworthy, as
some philosophers in the character debate argue that the flndings ofpersonality
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psychology and social psychology are in opposition and view ‘situationism’ as a
conceptually viable theory (e.g. Dons 2002, Harman 1999a).
The origins of social psychology are in late 19th centuiy crowd, or nwss
psychology (e.g. Le Bon 1975 [1895]), a field heavily influenced by philosophical
idealism. Crowd psychology postulated that ‘crowd mmd’ controlled group behaviour,
thereby sharing in one of idealistic philosophy’s conceits: group behaviour is inferior to
that of enlightened individuals9. The “individu isolé possède l’aptitude à dominer ses
réflexes, alors que la foule en est dépourvue.” [“The detached individual has the abihty
to dorninate his reflexes, while the crowddoes not.”] (Le Bon 1975: 57).
There is truth to the view that crowds commit awful deeds. However, the view
that the members of a crowd evince ‘simple emotions’ is unwananted: people may
outwardly conform, inwardÏy rebel. Furthermore, crowds can accomplish pro-social
actions; for example, non-violent resistance to police brutality in 1 960s America led to
greater equality for blacks, and volunteer teams routinely form to aid in the search for
missing children, often abductcd by ‘lone wolves’.
Social psychology began to shake off its pseudo-scientific origins in the early
2O century. In 1924, Floyd Aliport introduced the first scientific social psychology
textbook and the field grew explosively in North America thereafter. Before the
advances of cognitive neuroscience, social psychology seemed psychology’s sole
success story. Major accomplishments include the study of altmism and the creation of
conflict resolution techniques for the workplace.
‘ This outlook persists in hermeneutic psychology; for example, Heidegger states that in the crowd
“[elveryone is the other, and no one is himself’ (1964: 165).
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However, social psychology has, in a sense, stayed true to its roots, unveiling
many distasteful and ethically reprehensible characteristics of human behaviour. For
example, people conform to group opinions even when they lmow these opinions are
wrong- a case of ‘The Emperor Has No Clothes’ (Asch 1955 c.f. Baron & Byme 1997).
The ‘group effect’ can cause individuals to suppress helping behaviour. Witness the
Kitty Genovese case where a woman tvas stabbed to death outside an apartment
complex under the gaze of many witnesses, none of whom helped, not even by
telephoning police. Worse yet, people operating within hierarchical social systems can
commit awful crimes without feeling responsible for them. The Holocaust trials brought
forth the reality that people disavow responsibility for their actions when they are ‘just
following orders’.
The Holocaust is a modem atrocity committed in a modem society. In its wake,
racist doctrines that had aftributed foul acts to ‘savages’ were stripped oftheir
legitirnacy: a ‘civilised’ people canied out the Holocaust. We 110W know that genocide
has occurred in many societies, many times in history (Diamond 1997). Genocides- and
many have occurred since the Holocaust- urge us to understand human nature; with its
dark possibilities uncovered and understood, perhaps genuine change can begin.
2.2 The Miigram Experiment
Stanley Miigram vas horrified by the Holocaust and curions as to how
obedience to an anti-social authority, the Nazis, occuned. He felt that the Holocaust’s
“inhuman policies may have originated in the mmd ofa single person, but they could
only have been carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of people obeyed
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orders” (Miigram 1974: 1). Miigram decided to study the phenomenon ofobedience
empirically. The experiments that make up ‘Obedience to Authority’ (OA) are among
the most notorious in the histoiy ofpsychology’°. A typical experimental variant is
presented in what follows.
In each experimental trial, two people cntered a Yale University laboratory to
take part in a study on the effects ofpunishment on learning. Subjects were males aged
20 to 50, recruited either through an ad in a local newspaper or tbrough direct mailing,
paid 4$ in advance - approximately $25 today - for participation in the 1-hour
experiment. An experimenter greeted the subjects, introduced the theory and
experimental procedure, and had the subjects draw lots. According to these, one subject
was assigned the role of ‘teacher’ and the other the role of ‘learner’. The leamer was
led to an adjoining room and had his arm strapped to an electrode. The teacher watched
the lcamer’s preparation and then retumed to the main experimentation room.
The teacher sat down in front of a shock generator. The generator had switches
that delivered electric cunent to the electrode strapped to the leamer. The teacher
would read word pairs to the learner, and then read a testing sequence to which the
learner would respond with one of four possible answers. The teacher spoke to the
leamer through a microphone; the Icamer indicated their response through an answering
device whose buttons corresponded to the possible answers.
The teacher was ordered to shock the leamer if the leamer failed to answer
correctly. The shocks began at 15 volts and increased by 15 V each time a wrong
answer, or no answer, was given (i.e. Shock Level = (15 + 15(n-l)) V, where n= the
A description ofcxperimental procedure is found in Milgram (1974); Milgram & Johnson (1965) is a
documentai-y video featuring samples of the experiments with commentai-y.
36
cumulative number ofmistakes). The generator ran up to 450V, equal to 30 mistakes.
Labels conesponding to the switches indicated ‘Slight Shock’ (15V-60V), ‘Moderate
$hock’ (75V-120V), ‘Strong Shock’ (135V-180V), ‘Very Strong Shock’ (195V- 240V),
‘Intense Shock’ (255V-300V), ‘Extreme Intensity Shock’ (315V-360V), ‘Danger:
Severe Shock’ (375V-420V). The 435V and 450V switches were marked ‘XXX’. If
asked, the experimenter told subjects that although the shocks were extremely painful
they did flot cause permanent damage.
This was the apparent experiment; Miigram was deceiving his subjects. In each
experimental trial, the ‘teacher’ was the only genuine subject; the experimentcr and
‘tearner’ were confederates. The actual subject was aiways assigned the role ofteacher.
Once lefi alone in the adjoining room, the learner removed the electrode from his arm.
He then set up a tape recorder that would play pre-recorded, and intensifying, vocal
responses once the clectric cunent entered the ‘Moderate Shock’ zone; these responses
could be heard clearly through the walls ofthe adjoining room.
In cadi trial, the leamer providcd the same pattem of answers to the pair
leaming task; approxirnately tliree wrong answers for cadi correct one. As teachers
progressed through shock-levels, the icamer began to respond audibly. The 75V shock
produced grunts from the adjoining room. If tic teacher continued to higher voltages,
these grunts became screams and protcsts. At 300V the learner shouted that he would
no longer answer, at 315V lie gave an agonised scream and shouted that he “was no
longer a participant” (ibid: 23), and after 330V he was silent. If a teacher tried to
cease the leamer’s shocks the experimenter would verbally push the teacher to continue
using a series ofscripted prods:
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The experimenter. . . [used] as many as necessaiy to bring the subjcct into une.
Prod 1: Please continue, or, Please go on.
Prod 2: The experiment requires that you continue.
Prod 3: It is absolutely essential that you continue.
Prod 4: You have no other choice, you must go on.
The prods were made in sequence: Only if Prod 1 had been unsuccessful
could Prod 2 be used. If the subject refused to obey the experimenter after Prod
4, the experiment was terminated. (ibid: 21)
No other measures were taken to ensure that the teacher continued the
experiment; the teacher was free to cease participation at any time.
Miigram asked psychiatrists to estimate at what level teachers would break-off
their participation in the OA experiments. The psychiatrists “predicted that most
subjects would not go beyond the lOtit shock level [150V].. .about 4 percent would
reach the 20th shock level [300V], and about one subject in a thousand would administer
the highest shock level on the board” (ibid: 31). The actual resuits wcre as follows:
amongst 40 subjects, 20% ceased in the Strong Shock range (135V- 180V), 5% ceased
in the Intense Shock range (255V-300V), 12.5% ceased in the Extreme Intensity Shock
range (315V-360V) and 62.5% continued to the highest shock level.
Milgram initially ran four variations ofthe experiment. The one described above
is the ‘Voice-Feedback’ variation: the teacher hears the leamer’s protests. The
‘Remote’ variation featured no vocal responses; the leamer expressed discomfort by
banging on the wall. The ‘Proximity’ variation had the leamer in the same room as the
teacher, visible and audible. The ‘Touch-Proximity’ variation had the teacher hold the
leamer’s hand down on a shock plate to give the shock. The variations lcd to the
following resuits: “[35] percent of the subjects defled the experimenter in the Remote
condition, 37.5 percent in Voice-Feedback, 60 percent in Proximity, and 70 percent in
Touch-Proximity” (ibid: 36).
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Miigram conducted further variations. A fifth variation changed the location of
the experiment from prestigious Yale to a dingy office building. Furthermore, the
learner announced that they had a mild heart condition, to which the experimenter
repeated that the shocks are painful but cause no permanent tissue damage. Otherwise,
this variation was identical to the Voice-Feedback condition. There was no significant
change in results. A sixth variation changed the personnel; the experimenter became
soft-spoken, the leamer tough. No significant change in resuits was detected. A
seventh variation had the experimenter leave the room afier the opening instructions and
provide verbal prods by telephone. In this case, obedience dropped to 20.5 %.
Among the remaining variations, only one had significantly different resuits.
This was when subjects were free to choose the shock-level. In this variation, only 1
subject went up to the 30th shock level, one other to the 25th level, and remaining
subjects stayed below 150V”. OA was repeated with female subjects and with various
ages and nationalities with similar results (fora review sec Blass 1991).
Miigram was unable to explain his evidence. “I am certain that thcre is a
complex pcrsonality basis to obedience and disobedience. . .1 have not found it”
(Miigram 1974: 205). Milgram framed his resuits in terms of the remarkable power of
authority:
Subjects have leamed from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of
moral conduct to hurt another person against his wilI. Yet almost haif the
subjects abandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who had
no special powers to enforce his commands. (ibid. 41)
Interestingly, this resuit is comparable to that which the psychiatrists Miigram surveyed had prcdicted.
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Miigram notes that the narrowing oftlie obedient subject’s attention. Subjects
focus on the task at hand (i.e. reading the word list and operating the shock generator)
rather than the larger issue of hurting a fellow human being. Miigram dubs this the
‘agentic state’; obedient subjects become ‘agents’ in realising the experimenter’s ends:
Although a person acting under authority performs actions that seem to
violate standards of conscience, it would flot be true to say that lie loses lis
moral sense. Instead, it acquires a radically different focus. He does not
respond with a moral sentiment to the actions he performs. Rather, his moral
concem now shifts to a consideration of how well he is living up to the
expectations that the authority bas ofhim” (Miigram 1974: 8).
No explanation ofOA has bcen produced in social psychology (Blass 1991) or
in psychology as a whole (Nissani 1990).
I speculate that an explanation lies in neuropsychological work on human neural
category systems (Ashby & Eh 2001), the brain systems that aHow people to judge if
something is correct or incorrect. One of these systems appears to operate at a
procedural level (i.e. knowledge of ‘how to’ do things that cannot be easlly verbahised);
another proceeds at a declarative level. Both of these systems operate simultaneously,
although one might be dominate in the generation ofbehaviour. Psychotogist Grcgoiy
Ashby notes that radiologists, who can identify tumours arnidst the black and white
spiotches of an x-ray, provide a paradigm of the procedural system (Ashby 2003,
October 17). A case ofthe declarative system is a mathematical grouping procedure
(e.g. 2/4, 4/8, 30/60, and 75/150 belong in the same group because they reduce to 1/2).
The declarative system is rnediated by the frontal lobe of the brain, the source of
voluntary decision-making and abstract rules. In contrast, the procedural system is
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strongly tied to the motor system and leams response positions and movements (e.g. a
pattem of movement such as flicking switches). I note that obedience within the OA
involved a motor task; subjects flicked a switch if the wrong answer was indicated. The
operation of a shock generator is a fairly demanding physicai task, one that may have
shifted the subject’s awareness away from the moral dilemma and towards manipulating
the machine (Carver 1975, c.f. Blass 1991: 407).
Subjects who obeyed the OA experimenter were doing something ‘right’ at the
procedural level (i.e. they werc canying out the task set out by the researcher) even as
they were doing something ‘wrong’ (i.e. hurting another person). While most obedient
people had die requisite declarative moral knowledge (e.g. mies such as ‘Do no harm’)
to know that harming the learner was wrong, perhaps their behaviour was generated
using their procedural system.
Some dissenters may have intemalised (i.e. encoded as procedural knowledge)
‘how to’ resist orders during their upbringing. Another possibiÏity is that disobedient
subjects were able to ‘switch over’ to using declarative knowledge to guide their
behaviour. Even so, the subjects faced the difficuit task of disobeying the orders of an
experimenter whom they had previously agreed to aid and had accepted payment from.
The most disturbing aspect of the OA is that most subjects in the Milgram study
displayed conflicted obedience. The documentary film of the experiment shows
obedient subjects tittering, sweating, and clearly distressed. Confticted individuals’
may have had their declarative systems active, yet these systems failed to control their
task behaviour (i.e. flicking the switch). The agitation suggests something ofa ‘battie’
between several behavioural systems, with the procedural system ‘wilming out’.
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Taking a neuropsychological approach to OA suggests a slew ofresearch
programs for moral psychologists and applied ethicists. For example, how can
dcclarative knowledge be made to ‘win out’? Is it in fact aiways desirable that peopie
rely on declarative systems (i.e. does relying on declarative mies resuit in virtuous
behaviour)? Can selective disobedience (i.e. disobedience towards cruel orders) be
encoded at a procedural level?
Regardless of one’s approach to moral psychology or to ethics, Milgram’s
findings should add a sense of urgency to ethical efforts. Even ‘normal’ people mn the
risk of doing evil when so commanded.
2.3 The Prediction ofBehaviour
In 196$, Walter Miscbel published an influential rnetaanalytic’2 review of
personality research in which he criticised personality theories developed without input
from rigorous experimentation. Mischel feit that experiments have “implications [that]
have flot been explored thoroughly” (Mischel 196$: 1). His pronouncements
emboldened views on the ‘power ofthe situation’. Mischel examined a wide anay of
personality topics (e.g. attitudes, cognitive ability, avoidance, and sexual identification).
1-Iowever, most psychologists focused on his analysis of the tink between personality
and behaviour. To many, the analysis suggested ineparable flaws in personality
research.
The thrust of Mischel question was “what do particular personality constructs
add to the analysis, prediction, and modification ofbehavior-what is their utility?”
12 Meta-analyses are the mathematical compilation of the resuits of severat studies.
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(Mischel 1968: 4). Mischel examined psychodynamic (e.g. freudian) and trait theories
of personality in view of “research programs that have tried to identify individual
differences on variables and to assess their relations to other things that the person says
or does in different situations” (Mischel 1968: 81). Both theories assume that overt
behaviour signifies underlying personality factors and that personality theories posit that
personality is “more or Iess stable regardless ofthe situation” (ibid: 6). Taken together,
these assumptions are problematic. If behaviour is highly situationally specific, then
why infer that personality is stable?
Mischel relied heavily on a study by Hartshome and May (1928). This smdy had
“surprised psychologists by showing that the ... moral behavior of children is not
strongly consistent across situations and measures” (Mischeï 196$: 36). Hugh
Hartshome and Mark May investigated social behaviour in childrcn to monitor the
success of character training (i.e. moral education) in schools. They noted that
“[t]heories of ethical training... suffer from lack of data... [hjundreds of millions of
dollars are probably spent annually by churches, Sunday schools, and other
orgatiizations for chiidren and youth with almost no check on the product” (Hartshorne
& May 1928: 5).
Hartshome and May worked during the ascendancy of clinical work in
personality (e.g. psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and psychotherapy). Psychological data
xvas typically collected from case studies. This method of observation involves infening
laws from the study ofa small number ofpeople, who were most often mental patients,
i.e. abnorrnal (see e.g. Freud 1961 [1909]). Running against the grain, Hartshome and
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May chose a “path of extensive testing and statistical interpretation” (Hartshome &
May 1928: 6).
Hartshome and May studied moral lapses (i.e. failure to adhere to moral codes)
such as cheating on tests, stealing of trinkets, and lying. The experimenters explored
children’s behaviour in ‘natural’ settings, e.g., classrooms and play areas, where
situations were orchestrated to provide opportunities for deception. These situations
were kept within everyday bounds; the experiments used tests, games, and surveys. For
example, a test for cheating provided children with an opportunity to copy answers on a
quiz from a neighbour: two different quizzes were written, and these were distributed in
such a way that such cheating was evident.
The study involved over 10 000 students from different economic, religious and
demographic backgrounds. Their resuits surprised them. There was a “large place
occupied by the ‘situation’ in the suggestion and control of conduct, not only in its
larger aspects.. .but also in its more subtie aspects” (ibid: 413). The experimenters
discovered widespread deception and found few purely ‘honest’ or ‘dishonest’ cases
(i.e. there were few chiidren who consistently failed to cheat or who consistently
cheated). They noticed certain trends: older children are more deceitful, more intelligent
chiidren more honest, and emotionally unstable chiidren more dishonest. Yet, there was
no clear conelation between a particular type of person and consistently honest
behaviour. Nor was there indication of an honesty trait: “honesty or dishonesty is flot a
unified character trait in the children of the ages studied, but a series ofspecific
responses to specific situations” (ibid: 243).
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The common factors in moral lapses were the desire for success in a task and the
possibility ofreceiving rewards. Hartshorne and May’s conclusion for improving moral
behaviour was to create and maintain environments that encouraged honesty and
discouraged deception. They advocated changes to the existing school environment, so
that practical opportunities for deception were limited.
There is no evidence for supporting that children who are more likely to
resort to deceptive methods than other would flot use honorable methods with
equal satisfaction if the situation in which dishonesty is practiced were
sufficiently controlled..
. [the] attention of educators should be placed not so
much on devices for teaching honesty or any other ‘trait’ as on the
recommendation of school practices in such a way as to provide ... opportunities
for the successful use by both teachers and pupils of such forms of conduct as
make for the common good. (ibid: 414)
To put this in a contemporary educational psychology context, chiidren can be
encouraged to more effectively self-regulate behaviour with self-motivation rather than
reward based motivation (Dcci & Flaste 1995). Children motivated by the intrinsic
pleasure of a task suffer fewer ‘moral lapses’ than if motivated by a reward or a grade.
Mischel interpreted this study, and others, as evidence against character traits.
He concluded that there was at best a 30% conelation achieved between an individual’s
behaviour in situation x (e.g. cheating on a test) and behaviour in situation y (e.g.
cheating in a game); ofien this conelation was doser to 10 or 20 %. The corollary for
traits is that if a questionnaire is used to measure a trait in situation x will have only a
30% predictive power in situation y.
When testing 2 or more variables, psychologists propose a nuÏÏ hypothesis; this
hypothesis predicts that correlation (conventionally assigned the symbol r) between the
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variables under study (for example, heart disease and stress-level) wilI flot be
significantly different than the conelation expected by chance, i.e. r = 0. Statistical
analysis of the data determine whether the nuli hypothesis can be rejected; i.e. whether a
conelation significantly greater than chance is present between the variables. The level
ofcorrelation needed to reject the nuli hypothesis is typically set between 0.01 and 0.05
(HoweIl 1997).
The correlation that Mischel reported between CT and behaviour is statisticaÏly
sigi4ficant; i.e. deviates far enough away from chance to reject the nuil hypothesis and
to attribute some relation betwcen the two variables. Mischel sums up his look at CT
with ambivalence: “[s]tatistically signi ficant relationships of this magnitude are
sufficient to justify personality research on individual and group differences. It is
equally plain that their value for making statements about an individual are severely
limited.” (Mischel 1968: 38). This critique shook the confidence of rnany personality
psychologists.
However, Mischel’s conclusion was ‘revolutionary’ only to those ignorant of
neuropsychology. Neuropsychologists had already abandoned a ‘one-to-one approach’
of linking x behaviour to x trait (or x behaviour to x situation) in favour of a dynamic
approach. In his landmark work, The Organization ofBehavior, Donald Hebb noted that
while the “tradition in psychology has long been a search for the property ofthe
stimulus which by itselfdetermines the ensuing response.. .[t]his approach . . .is no
longer satisfactory as theory” (Hebb 2002 [1949]: 4).
Mischel’s view on the conceptual basis ofpersonality is questionable. The
hypothesis that there is a Iawful pattem to personality (e.g. traits) is compatible with the
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observation of substantial behavioural variation, especially if personality is a dynamic
system. Behavioural variation is a feature oflife; any organism that fails to adjust its
behaviour to changes in its environment will go extinct. The use of traits in a theory
system predicts neither uniform nor vastty different hehaviour; trait theories gain their
‘colour’ through the specific hypotheses that are constructed (e.g. what kinds of
behaviour a trait is tied to). A recurrent problem in personality research is the neglect of
operational hypotheses. To restate Mischel’s concem, many personality theories lack
operational hypotheses. The reply of some ofMischel’s critics was that a lack of
operational hypotheses in trait theories is a feature of sloppy theorising.
A further problem is that Mischel’s discoveiy ofa ‘conelation ceiling’ fails to
address its theoretical significance. What does a 10%-30% ‘correlation ceiling’ signifi?
Does lirnited role for traits indicate a large role for ‘situations’? Sarason et al. (1975)
analysed the effects ofdispositional and situational factors in severat studies and found
that situations account for an average of 10.3 % of variance, versus 8.7 % for
personality. The situational “margin of superiority is by no means striking enough for
them to be considered prepotent” (ibid: 204)’.
Several critics have chided Mischel for his naiveté vis-à-vis the scientific
process (e.g. Block 2002, Eysenck 1982). Others have singled out the situationist
personality debate out for philosophical sloppiness, noting that “[bJoth the situationist
and dispositionist views are clearly inadequate” (Baumeister 1999: 367). However,
Mischel’s critique had a largely curative effect on psychology; it shocked many
psychologists out of their own scientific and philosophical naiveté. Most psychologists
This tempers philosopher John Dons’ daim that the “experimental record suggests that situational
factors are often better predictons of behavior than personal factors” (Dons 2002: 2).
47
are now professed interactionists; i.e. environment and organism interact in the
production of behaviour. Mischel is correct to say that the way people act, “cannot be
isolated meaningfully from the conditions in which he does it” (Mischel 196$: 293).
Mischel concedes that contemporary theories “increasingly have corne to
recognize that behavior tends to change with alterations in the situations in which it
occurs.. .[that] the same basic underlying disposition.. .may manifest itselfbehaviorally
in diverse ways” (ibid: 39). Global CT are “excessively crude. . .to encompass
adequately the extraordinary complexity and subtlety of the discriminations that people
constantly make” (ibid: 301). So crude, in fact, that no scientific theory could rely on
them.
2.4 The Good Samaritan
Many social psychologists took Mischel’s (flawed) critique to heart and sought
to dismantlc CT. John Darley and Daniel Batson (1973) were guided by the view that,
“research on bystander intervention in emergency situations... has had bad luck in
finding personality determinants ofhelping behavior” (ibid: 100). A person “who was
likely to be honest in one situation was not particularly likely to be honest in the next”
(ibid: 100).
Darley and Batson turned to the parable of the Good Samaritan for an
experirnental scenario. In the parable, a man is robbed and wounded by highwaymen
and left by the side of the road. A priest and then a Levite (priest’s assistant) pass by the
man without helping. f inally, a Samaritan helps the man, taking him to an mn and
paying for his treatrnent. It seems that personality factors play a part in the parable: the
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priest and Levite are devotedly religious, whereas the Samaritan is spiritual. Darley and
Batson note that simational factors play a role; “[nJot only was the Samaritan most
likely thinking about more mundane matters than the priest and the Levite, but, because
he was socially less important, it seems likely that he was operating on a quite different
time schedule” (ibid: 101). Darley and Batson set out to recreate the parable, using
seminary students as unwitting experimental subjects.
‘The Good Samaritan’ experiment sets out three hypotheses. 1) People “thinking
ethicaÏ and religious thoughts will be no more likely to offer aid than persons thinking
about something else” (ibid. 101). 2) Persons “encountering a possible helping situation
when they are in a huny vil1 be less likely to offer aid than persons flot in hurry” (ibid.
100-101). 3) People “religious in a Samaritan-like fashion will help more frequently”
(ibid. 101).
To test the personality hypothesis, Darlcy and Batson had serninary students
“participate in a study on religious education and vocations” (ibid: 101). Participants
were given a test to measure religiosity using three separate instruments (personality
questionnaires); these determined if participants saw religion as a means to other ends
(e.g. etemal tife), as an end in itself, or as a quest for personal meaning. The latter two
types ofretigiosity were deemed ‘Samaritan-like’.
The situational hypotheses were tested in a later session: the participants were
told to go to a specific building on campus to give a talk. To test the ‘thought content’
hypothesis, one group of participants was told to speak on the Good Sarnaritan parable,
another group told to speak on vocations. To test the ‘huny’ hypothesis, these two
groups were subdivided. Some participants were told to hurry, some given no special
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instructions with regards to time, and a third group were told to depart even though they
were a bit carly.
The participants were given a route to follow. Along the way, they passed a
“victim [an experimental confederate]... slumped in a doonvay, head down, eyes
closed, flot moving. As the subject passed by, the victim coughed twice and groaned,
keeping his head down.” (ibid. 104). The participants were rated on a four point
helping scale according to their behaviour towards the victim:
O = failed to notice the victim as possibly in need at ail; 1 = perceived the
victim as possibly in need but did flot offer aid; 2 did flot stop but heiped
indirectly (e.g., by telling ... assistant about the victim); 3 stopped and asked
if the victim necded help; 4 afier stopping, insisted on taking the victim
inside an then ieft him. (ibid: 104).
0f the factors measured, only huny had a statistically significant impact on
helping behaviour14. Unhurried subjects offered help 63% of the time, intermediate
hurry 45% and high huny 10%. Darley and Batson note that “[aï person not in a hurry
may stop and offer help to a person in distress. A person in a hurry is likely to kecp
going” (ibid: 107). The experimenters note that the hurried subjects seemed not to
notice the victims; they speculate that subjects “did not perceive the scene in the aiiey as
an occasion for an ethical decision” (ibid: 108).
Those neither rushed nor unhurried, and who had failed to help, often rcported
being “in conftict between stopping to help the victim and continuing on his way to help
the experimenter. . . [c]onflict, rather than caliousness can explain their failure to stop”
(ibid: 108). Darley and Batson conclude that “whether a person heips or flot is an
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instant decision likely to be situationally controlled. . . [h]ow a person helps involves a
more complex and considered number of decisions, including the time and scope to
permit personality characteristics to shape them” (ibid: 108).
A possible interpretation of this experiment is that human beings have
perceptual capacities that can be exhausted by complex tasks (e.g. hunying). From a
VE point ofview, education could train people to ‘hone in’ on certain environmental
features, e.g., improve their ability to perceive distress. This sort of ‘preventative
perceptual training’ is the goal of some first Aid programs, where participants are made
aware of the dangers present in their own environments in order to avoid them.
Another possible interpretation sunounds a budding cognitive neuroscience
theory wherein the motor system plays a major roTe in ‘decision making’. In this view,
“behaviour is seen as a constant battie between currently availabte opportunities for
action. . . the brain continually transforms sensoiy information into the parameters of
potential actions” (Cisek 2001: 36_37)15. Most ofthis processing occurs unconsciously.
I speculate that a person who is hunying passes things too quickly to process ‘helping’
as a behavioural ‘option’. I also venture that with sufficient perceptual training, as
described above, people would be more Iikely to notice unobtrusive stimuli as an
opportunity to help.
4 However, some subjects offered ‘super-help’, e.g. offering to take the victim for coffee; this sort of
behaviour was flot recorded on the 4-point scak.
‘ Perhaps fans of Heidegger’s (1964) ‘Being-in-the-world’ have something to celebrate, coupled, I hope,
with the humble admission that that Heidegger would reject a neural explanation.
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2.5 The Fundamental Attribution Enor
We label people ail the time; the curt shopkeeper is a ‘jerk’ rather than ‘a person
having a bad day’ and the quiet student is ‘shy’ rather than ‘bored’. These ‘attributions
of character’ are formed with minimal observation and scanty background knowledge.
The way that peopie attribute ‘dispositions’, and ignore situations, is cailed the
fundamentat Attribution Error (FAE).
Attribution theorist fritz Heider (1958) is credited with identifying the error.
Heider’s research is “concemed with the attempts of ordinary peopie to understand the
causes and implications ofthe events they witness” (Ross 1977: 174). Peopie have
beiiefs that, while perhaps incorrect, have a significant impact on their behaviour (e.g.
religious beliefs, racial stereotypes).
A characteristic of naïve perception is its ‘economy’. We perceptually seek
features that “serve to integrate a bewildering mass of data in the rnost economicai
terms” (Heider 1958: 53). Heider rernarks that most people attribute unitary causes to
events: internai or external. ‘Internai causation’ inciudes judgements about ability and
personality. ‘External forces’ inciudejudgements of good or bad luck, i.e. situationai
factors arranged in a manner favourable or unfavourable to the subject.
Economy leads “[n]aive psychology ... to isolate [i.e. ignore] those wavering,
more fortuitous conditions that interfere with ... constancy” (Heider 195$: 92). One
example ofthis sort of ‘iean’ attribution is inferring that when “a person brings about a
number of changes in the environment, and one of them is generally considered much
more attractive than the others, we wiit take for granted that it was the person’s goal”
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(ibid: 115). Likewise, if someone commits a ‘cruel’ behaviour, e.g. siams a door in
another person’s face, we might attribute a cruel intention, without knowledge of
whether the behaviour was accidentai or intentional.
Lee Ross (1977) develops Heider’s attribution theory to address CT. He
hypothesises that people tend to attribute the behaviour of others to ‘traits’ without
regards to situational factors. Ross raises fears about the “professionat psychologist’s
apparent susceptibility to this enor”(Ross 1977: 185). He suggests that the reason
Miigram, Darley and Batson, and Mischel aroused great controversy was that they
“contradicted flot only the formai theories ... but also the working assumptions that
guide ... everyday personal encounters” (ibid: 187) ofpsychologists. For example,
psychiatrists faiseiy predicted the outcome of the Miigram study and assumed that
subjects’ ‘characters’ would prevail.
Ross seems to equate psychologicai attribution patterns with psychological
theories. Yet, the use ofthe term ‘implicit theory’ is metaphorical; ‘pattems of
attribution’ is more accurate. Peopie fali back on these attribution patters when hurried,
stressed, or tired (e.g. Kunda 1999). Pattems of attribution must also be distinguished
from ‘folk psychology’ or ‘lay psychology’; the latter are the, often inconsistent, beliefs
that people hold about character. For example, a psychologist with a refined theory of
personality and a person with a ‘folk theory’ ofpersonality might exhibit a FAE pattem
of attribution when confronted with a stressftml situation. Afterwards, the former wouId
have the conceptual tools to explain what happened in psychologicai terms. To their
credit, the virtue ethicists in the character debate draw a distinction between the FAE
and CT research (i.e. Athanassoulis 1999, Kupperman 2001, Sreenivasan 2001).
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With the patternltheory distinction in place, it is unclear how the failure of
psychiatrists to predict Milgram’s resuit is evidence against character traits; these
psychiatrists were more likely guided by incomplete theories. The fAE needs to be used
carefully and tempered with its actual findings in attribution research. for example, the
attribution enor fades over time; in some cases, “the [FAE] may even disappear afier a
few days” (Burger 1991: 190). Perhaps a Middle Bast conflict attributed to a rash, or
heroic, President in the present will be attributed to an oil-dependent economy in the
near future.
Social psychological experiments illustrate the complexity of behaviour and
provide urgency to the proj cet of moral psychology. In contrast, its ‘situationist’
theoretical analyses stand as cautionaiy tales against sloppy theorising. I suspect that
Aristotelian VE has some of the theoretical complexity, and lacks the substantive
content, to incorporate social psychology. I will use character debate (Chapter 3&4) to
illustrate my suspicions.
Chapter 3: Threats to Character
If the field of ethics is strengthened by experimental input, this cornes with a
price; experirnents may entail the alteration, revision and rejection oftheories (Flanagan
1991). If experimental evidence requires the substantial alteration of conceptions of
character, VE is threatened (Dons 1998, 2002; Harrnan 1999a, 2001). However,
Aristotelian virtue theory has demonstrated its acceptance ofpsychological input. The
philosophers who seek to reject VE are best seen as attempting to stern naïve
interpretations of character.
3.1 Bridging the Gap between Psychology and Ethics
Both philosophers and psychologists have attempted to link psychology to
ethics, although rarely in co-operation. Psychologists philosophise outside the tradition;
for example, B.F. Skinner’s prornoted social behavioural engineering (sec e.g. Skiirner
1948) and Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg studied rnoral reasoning and
developrnent in chiidren (e.g. Kohlberg 1973, Piaget 1969 [1932]). Ethicists’ interest in
psychology has tended to lirnit itself to philosophical psychology. Owen flanagan
notes that phi[osophy and psycliology “almost neverjoin the saine debates, or if they
do, they do so in complete ignorance ofone another’ (1991: vii). Likewise, Gordon
Aliport obscrved that “two separate disciplines have evolved around the sarne subject
matter.. .scarcely aware ofthe other’s existence” (Aïlport 1960: 18).
Flanagan initiates the character debate by arguing that ethics should have sorne
contact with empirical psychology; he cites G.E.M. Anscombe as the source ofhis
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concem. Anscombe claimed that moral philosophy needs “an adcquate philosophy of
psychology” (Anscombe 198 1[1958]: 26). Flanagan notes deficiencies in the
psychology ofVE, where “[ijt is natural to think ofpersonality as something which is
powerfully immune to situationai instances” (Flanagan 1991: 260). Flanagan doubts
that this view is coherent; “[o]n any reasonable view traits are situation sensitive” (ibid:
280).
Flanagan argues that traits are “dispositional modules, which. . .vaiy in the
degree to which they are penetrabie or impenetrable, and in terms ofthcir frmnctional
role(s) and hierarchical position in an overali psychological econorny” (ibid: 277). The
‘penetrability’ of traits refers to our ‘lay ability’ to understand them; penetrability is
noted because Flanagan advocates a narrative approach to psychology (sec ibid: 56-78
and recali thc criticism of narrative work in 1.3). In tcnns ofthe role and hicrarchy of
traits, Ftanagan’s account recalEs an intcrpretation ofAristotelian psychology whereby
traits capture ail the psychological mechanisms necessary to explain behaviour (e.g.
dispositions to feci, think, and pcrccive).
F lanagan’s account is problematic bccause in Aristotle’s account meditating
psychological processes secm to play a rolc in bchaviour (recall 1.1). Furthcrmore,
Flanagan is somewhat ambiguous regarding the distinction between things and
properties- he notes that traits “are psychologically reat phenomena..
. [b]ut they are not
in a person the way, say, her shin bone or hypothalamus is” (Flanagan 1991: 277).
Similar ambiguity has plagued rescarch on CT (sec 5.1). The ernergent account (1.4)
distinguishes between things and their properties; for example, traits describe properties
ofpeople, while brains are things.
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Flanagan uses evidence from social psychology to arouse doubts in others about
the psychology underlying VE. Virtue theorists “are insufficiently aware ofthe degree
to which the virtues... [have] high degrees of situation sensitivity” (ibid: 15). “[E]ven
our more refined [personality] theories fail to prepare us for a situation [i.e. the OA
experiments] ... with such a dramatic effect” (ibid: 295). flanagan wams virtue
ethicists away from simplistic refutations ofOA. It “would be a mistake ... for the
defender of traits to daim that those who comply lack some global trait which those
who refuse possess” (ibid: 295). If what caused obedience was the lack of a character
trait, then 65% lacked the trait in variation 1, 62.5% in variation 2 and only 30% in
variation 3. A trait explanation has to show why groups ofrandomly drawn subjects
displayed similar obedience in the first two trials, and a different level of obedience in
the third. Was the third group randomly filled with virtuous people?
f lanagan suggests that in the case of OA, affective states may have lcd people to
disobey. Perhaps those who disobeyed felt sony for the leamer, their pity aroused by
past experience with electric shocks. This particular example must be disregarded;
Milgram made sure that all ‘teachers’ got a sample shock of 45V immediately before
the trial began. Nonetheless, f lanagan’s explanation might work in other cases; a
person may have their helping responses dampened when confronted with the object of
a phobia (e.g. spiders). Perhaps authority, and subordination to it, provokes its own
behavioural patterns. Social hierarchy plays a role in other social species; its role in
human nature also requires consideration (Krebs 1998).
I believe that f lanagan’s overali point is that behavioural generation involves a
complex system (i.e. the human organisrn), and may rely on several brain sub-systcms.
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Unfortunately, Flanagan cites virtually no rcsearch on character traits and makes
neuropsychology merely a peripheral part ofhis account. For example, f lanagan notes
the ‘modularity of the moral’; i.e. people could have the capacity for certain types of
moral actions and flot others (Flanagan 1991: 268-275). However, cognitive
neuroscience suggests only ‘weak modularity’ (see 5.2); I will later argue that there are
neurological systems that are essential to morality.
f lanagan’s oversimplification ofpsychology is perhaps an effort to make his
project less forbidding to novices. Yet, in my opinion, neuropsychology provides a
beffer way to state Flanagan’s case. Systemic functioning (i.e. several brain and
physiological systems interacting at once) may involve cases whereby a particular
system ‘wins out’ in the generation ofbehaviour (e.g. a voluntary effort to steady the
hand suppresses the involuntary reflex to pull it away).
Although Flanagan bclieves that most people have dispositions to help others,
the “worrisome thing is that such a... powerful disposition could be ncutralized so
easily by certain subtie environmental manipulations” (Flanagan 1991: 298). I think
that identifying, and overcoming, these ‘subtle manipulations’ indicates a challenge for
VE, flot a defeat. However, to meet this challenge, VE will need to rely on a more
sophisticated psychological approach than flanagan offers.
3.2 The End ofCharacter
Gilbert Harman (l999a) argues that flanagan’s optimism about VE is
empirically groundless. Social psychology reveals a minute role for character and a
large role for the situation. Character counts for little in the generation ofbehaviour;
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“[w]hat a person with a scemingly ideal moral character will do in a particular situation
is pretty much what anyone else will do in exactly that situation, allowing for variation”
(Harman 1999b: Objection to Reliance on Character Traits). Harman opposes virtue
theories based on character and supports one based on virtuous acts (Thomson 1997 c.f.
Harman 1999b). Act-based virtue theory can be dismissed here. This would be a
functionalist psychology (i.e. ignores the ‘inside’ ofthe agent); psychology has passed
through its functionalist stage.
Harman draws an analogy between our everyday intuitions about physics and
our everyday intuitions about psychology- an analogy bonowed from social
psychologists Nisbett and Ross (1991). People make mistakes in estimating the path of
an object dropped from a moving car; they also make errors in predicting behaviour.
Our attribution enors foster a belief in traits, which are “relatively long-term stable
disposition to act in distinctive ways” (Harman 1999a: Section 2), and conespondingly,
we are fascinated with virtues and vices.
Harman notes that the virtue ethicist, armed with a naïve view of personality,
would interpret the Miigram Experiment as dernonstrating a vice and conclude that
“everyone [has) this character defect” (Harman l999a: Section 5.1). Similarly, when
we look at the Good Samaritan trial we overlook “how much ofa hurry the various
agents might be in” (ibid: Section 5.1) and instead affix CT to their behaviour. Mischel
(196$) provides ftirther proof of the dismal predictive power ofCT. Harman declares
that VE is in trouble: “if wc know that there is no such thing as a character trait and we
know that virtue would require having character traits, how can we aim at becoming
virtuous agents?” (Harman 2001: 224).
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However, Harman misstates his case. Firstly, he confuses research on ‘implicit
trait theories’, which are actually patterns of attribution (recail 2.5), with actual theories
of CI. ‘folk physics’ is useless to physics, folk psychology cannot imprison scientific
psychology, nor folk ethics inform scientific ethics. However, applied VE will have to
contend with our tendency to falsely attribute behaviour.
Secondly, the task of prediction (e.g. from CI to a particular behaviour) and that
of explanation (e.g. the role CT play in the generation ofbehaviour) must be
distinguished. The failure to predict a phenomenon signals that a given theory is
incomplete rather than a failure; inaccurate models can predict where truer models fail
(Chaplin 1997). For example, my hunch that if the weather is cold today it will be cold
tomorrow will ofien predict the weather, but explains nothing. In contrast, a
meteorological model that incorporates manifold variables may fail to predict
tomorrow’s weather, yet will be far superior in terms of its explanatory resources and
ability to predict general trends.
Harman also oversimplifies Miigram; Harman daims that the variation where
“ail subjects were willing to go at least to the 300 volt level” was typical ofMiÏgram’s
trials (Harman 1999: Section 5.1). Harman is actually quoting an initial trial ofOA
(Milgram 1963); this trial involved the Remote Condition where the subject could
neither sec flot hear the leamer. In other experimental conditions (Miigram 1974),
subjects began to disobey at lower voltage levels (105V — 13 5V).
Harman neglects to investigate research on CT. He states that “there is no
empirical basis for the existence ofcharacter traits” (Harman 1999a: Section 1.1) and
daims that CT “must be distinguished from... iimate aspects of temperament such as
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shyness or being basically a happy or sad person” (Harman 1999a: Section 2). Yet,
there is empirical evidence for CI and this research incorporates neurobiology (see 5.1).
Harman proposes to solve the character debate by annihilating it: “[wJe need to
abandon ail talk of virtue and character, flot find a way to save it by reinterpreting it”
(Harman 2001: 224). Charitably, I suppose that Harman wants to destroy facile
accounts of character. Yet, simplicity is something that neither Aristotelian VE, nor
personaiity psychology, offers.
3.3 The Inadequacy ofCharactcr
John Dons (1998, 2002) delves into evidence for, against CT. Dons argues that
Aristotelian CI are robust and produce “regular behavioral manifestations”(Doris 2002:
1). Furthermore, he finds that “globalism runs far and wide through both
characterlogical moral psychology and personality psychology” (ibid: 23). Personality
psychology, due to its reliance on global traits, has “failed to find a convincing
explanation ofthe Miigram results” (ibid. 39). Yet, ‘situationism’ also fails to explain
OA; I submit that the resources needed to explain OA are possibly being developed in
neuropsychology.
Dons daims that, “the systematic observation of behavior. . .has revisionary
implications for ethical thought, particularly for ... neo-Aristotelian ethical theoiy”
(Dons 1998: 504). I agree with this statement. Dons then argues that “the approach to
moral psychology suggested by situationism enjoys certain advantages over
Aristotelianism as a foundation for normative thought” (ibid: 505). Here, I disagree.
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Situationism is flot a psychological theory; ‘situationist’ work demonstrates the
complexity ofbehaviour, flot its causes.
Dons’ views the cause ofbehaviour through a simple causal model (i.e. situation
or trait x causes behaviour y) rather than a complex systemic onc. Like Harman, Dons
sees the cross-situational stabiÏity of behaviour as the raison d’être ofpersonality
psychology and ignores that stability is flot required of dynamic systems.
Consequentially, he dismisses the relevance ofneuropsychology; “[ijfthere is... a
solution [to the problem of behavioural consistcncy] I have not seen it in biopersonality
literature any more than I have elsewhere” (ibid: $9).
Although Dons daims that situations suffice to explain bchaviour, he also
introduces a ‘local trait theory’ wherein “personality [is] conceived 0f asfragrnented”
(ibid. 64). Local trait x describes a person’s behaviour in situation x while local trait y
describes behaviour in situation y. Drawing on Hartshome and May (192$), Dons
suggests that local traits may be as specific as “answer key honest’ and ‘score-adding
honest” (Dons 2002: 64). fragmented personality theory accommodates the
observation that people behave in different ways in different situations. For example, a
person may be brave towards incoming soccer halls, but cowardly towards spiders.
Local traits can be iterated to allow something similar to, but not entirely as global as,
global traits. Someone might be honest on most kinds of tasks, yet dishonest on test
taking tasks. Dons states that the local model would not allow for virtue; virtue requires
on robust CT that lead to good in every circumstance.
Dons admits his model is embryonic and might contain imperfections;
nonetheless, he states that: “to conclude that local trait theory is impoverished as a
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psychological theory, a fiuller argument is required” (Dons 2002: 66). One point against
Dons’ model is îts failure to explain how te panse traits (i.e. fails te give a reason for
localising a trait description at a particular level). For example, why is ‘score-adding
honest’ preferable to ‘score-adding a math test honest’? A second is that Dons’ account
suggests ‘local neuronal systems’, e.g. isoiatcd to ‘score-adding honesty’. Yet brain
systems are oniy weakly compartmentalised (see 5.2); the neuropsychological isolation
of ‘score-adding honesty’ scems implausible16. Dons also fails te explain how novel
behaviours generated from localised traits (e.g. a person encountering a new situation
for which they have no traits) or conversely how localised traits are generated from
novel situations. I suspect Dons’ theory has been designed to refute cross-situational
stability rather than explain personality and behavioural generation.
Dons turns to attack other elernents of VE. He states that on “an intellectztatist
account, virtue consists in a distinctive ‘way ofseeing” (Dons 1998: 509). On this
view, virtue consists of more than just behaviour; what and how people view their
actions is important. Dons acknowledges the perception argument, noting only that “if
intellectualism de-emphasizes the importance of overt behavior tee much, it begins to
sound a little strange” (ibid: 510). Virtue ethicists aise daim that, “virtues are extremely
rare” (Dons 1998: 511). This should dampen our cnthusiasm for the virtue approach;
why teach virtue if no one can ever get it right? One answer is that achieving
continence, i.e. good behaviour through reflection, is an admirable goal. A second
answer is that the ranity ofvirtue is nota necessity, i.e., the possibility for improvement
exists.
16 A mainstay of behavioural neuropsychology is that “{t]wo concepts utay acquire a latent ‘association’
without ever having occurred together in the subject’spast experience” (Hebb 2002; 132).
63
Dons notes another reason to abandon VE; an ethics bascd on character seems
loaded with elitism. Aristotie praised good brecding (Dons 2002: 168) and VE,
dogmatically applied, may risk racism and eugenics. Aristotle’s praise for good
breeding reftects his faulty view that certain people were ‘natural slaves’. I note that
Aristotie is contradicting himself; elsewhere he stresses the importance of habit and
education.
Dons offers situationist ethics as an alternative to VE. Yet, a situationist
account, dogmatically applied, is as malefic as a ‘racist VE’. If people are determined
by their situations, they can adapt to any situation. A ‘situationist’ approach to societal
planrung dominated in Maoist China, where people were uprooted from their
homelands, and Stalinist Russia, where people were expected to the accept orders ofthe
Communist Party (Pinker 2001).
Furthermore, the daim that a situationist ethics offers “the promise of substantial
advantages in the practice of deliberation” (Dons 2002: 516) merits scepticism.
Declarative knowledge often fails to guide behaviour (e.g. obedient people in OA knew
that hurting people was wrong). The challenge may actually be to encode moral lessons
at a procedural level and discovering ways to teach people to ‘switch over’ to their
declarative categorisation systems (recall 2.2).
Flanagan, Dons and Hannan are guided by the desire to expel naïve
interpretations ofpsychology from ethics. However, the latter two manage to overlook
the qualities of the Aristotelian approach and ah have failed to note the sophistication of
cognitive neuroscience in which behaviour is mediated by a complex system.
Chapter 4: The Qualities of Virtue
As critics rise to attack character, virtue ethicists confront them. Athanassoulis
(2000) and Kupperman (2001) concentrate on Harman (1999a); Sreenivasan (2001)
engages Dons (1998, [and an in-press copy of] 2002). The virtue ethicists erect their
defences on the broader aspects ofAristotelian virtue theory and counter-attack by
questioning the applicability of social psychological research. However, they decline
substantive reforms to virtue ethics and neglect to draw on existing psychological
resources.
4.1 Emotion and Virtue
Nafsika Athanassoulis (2000) explains that Harman (1999a) views CT as either
a minor or negligible elernent in the explanation ofbehaviour. Those who think that the
“behaviour of agents is due to their distinctive character traits... [are] commifting the
fundamental attribution enor and the main moral theory guilty of committing this enor
is Virtue Ethics” (Athanassoulis 2000: 215). Harman believes that naive observers
attnibute behaviour to character and that naive observers are especially prominent in VE.
Athanassoulis counters that the Miigram Experiment was “designed to test the
hypothesis that most people would remain compassionate. . . even when under pressure
from orders to do otherwise” (ibid: 216). In other words, Milgram examined, at best,
the existence of specific CT; his results cannot dismantle the field of personality, only
knocks out lower-level hypotheses, e.g. that people are reliably compassionate. OA
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“examined a specific reaction to a specific situation and did flot reveal much about the
subjects’ Iongterm dispositions” (ibid: 217).
Athanassoulis notes that Aristotelian resources are available with which to
examine OA, notably the distinctions between vicious, virtuous, continent and
incontinent people (recail 1.1). For example, while vicious people might behave
similarly to incontinent people, VE predicts that their emotions will differ. I note that
Milgram (1974) seems to note this sort ofvariability. A subject in the Vocal Feedback
Variation, “despite . . . nurnerous, agitated objections, .. . continuous and persistent
dissent, . . . continues to administer the shocks. . . by no stretch of the imagination can it
be said that this man wanted to administer shocks to the leamer” (Miigram 1974: 77).
In contrast, a subject in the Touch-Proximity Variation bas his “hard impassive face
show total indifference as he subdues the screarning leamer and gives him shocks. He
seems to derive no pleasure from the act itself, only quiet satisfaction at doing hisjob
properly” (ibid: 46).
Athanassoulis comments, in passing, that Milgram’s findings could suggest
character differences, as “there were differences between different people to the extent
to which they were willing to continue with the experiment” (Athanassoulis 2000: 217).
She posits that this could be the resutt of an obedience trait; some people may have a
disposition to follow orders. However, she fails to explore research on CT. In sum,
“there is no reason to assume that [the Miigram Experiment] threatens the viability of
any version ofvfrtue ethics which relies on character traits” (ibid: 217).
Athanassoulis also tums to the distinction between virtue, continence, etc, to
counter the Good Samaritan experiment. She daims that non-helpers were incontinent,
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or flot fully virtuous, people unable to resist the ‘temptation’ of lateness whereas
virtuous people arc flot “side-tracked by great temptation or undcr difficuit
circumstances” (Athanassoulis 2000: 219). The virtuous person “is kind and
compassionate in ail circumstances. . . no matter how difficuit it is to do so” (ibid: 219),
whereas those who did not help the victim “could not resist the self-centred desire to
present [their] lecture” (ibid: 219).
Here the continence/incontinence explanation fits less wetl. Darley and Batson
observe that for ‘non-helpers’, “it would be inaccurate to say that [subjects] realized the
victim’s possible distress, then chose to ignore it ... because of the tirne pressures, they
did flot perceive the scene in the alley as an occasion for an ethical decision” (1973:
108). Perception, rather than temptation, may be at issue (recall 2.4).
While Athanassoulis notes the resources of VE, she faits to restore them.
4.2 The Rarity ofVirtue
bel Kupperman notes that Harman (1999a) attacks “the idea ofvirtuous
character” (Kupperman 2001: 239). Although Harman’s arguments “raise interesting
and important issues in the border area between social psychology and moral
philosophy.. [they are] misconstmed” (ibid: 240). Specifically, Harrnan’s arguments
“gain much ofwhat plausibility they have from ... picking a soft target: a strain within
folk psychology that offers an excessively simple view of what character is” (ibid:
240)’.
17 In fact, Harman identifies no clear target; he mislabels the Fundamental Attribution Error (fAE) as a
‘folk theory’.
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Kupperman remarks that a “major strain in cunent American folk psychology...
regards virtue as roughly equivalent to ‘niceness’, and that tends to think... that rnost
people simply are virtuous” (ibid: 241). Miigram concurs: he notes that for some,
“there is an image of man that simply does flot admit the type ofbehavior observed in
the experiment
... [and theyJ are doubly convinced that American in particular do not
act inhumanely against their fellows on the orders of authority” (Milgram 1974: 169).
Kupperman denies that the ‘people are nice’ view is universal and notes the
existence of more sophisticated accounts. He cites Plato’s stoiy about Glaucon’s ring as
a view of character that posited “very few genuinely virtuous people” (Kupperman
2001: 242). The ring can grant its owner invisibility; Plato recounts how this power
corrupts a humble and habitually good shepherd. Kupperman voices the idea that rnost
of us arc like the ring-bearer: ‘good’ until put to the test. The Greeks would
acknowledge the Miigram study as proofthat, given a difficuit situation, few are
virtuous. Perhaps Greek philosophers, experienced in military service, had a better idea
ofthe vile acts people are capable of
Kupperman cites modem literature for another view of character, a view where
people are continually “getting things wrong and then leaming from mistakes” (ibid:
243). Our first encounter with situations may Iead to mistakes; people behave poorly,
and sometimes badly, in new situations. Kupperman notes that Milgram makes an
effort to show that his experiment taught many subjects to become better people. I note
that one participant wrote Milgram to say that:
Participation in the ‘shock experirnent’... has had a great impact on my
life.. .{t]o permit myselfto be drafted [into military service in Vietnam]
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...submitting to authority’s demand. . .would make me frightened ofmyself.. .1
am fully prepared to go to jail if I am flot granted Conscientious Objector status
(Miigram 1974: 200).
Kupperman’s point about moral leaming is well taken; however,
neuropsychological resources will better serve its development. Firstly,
neuropsychology distinguishes between declarative and procedural learning; a lack of
the requisite procedural knowledge may explain why people cannot perform tasks on
their first try. Neuropsychology will also note why some people learn moral lessons and
why certain people fail to do so (see Churchiand 1998). Although Kupperman
acknowledges the difflculty of studying personality, which changes as people leam and
grow, I sec this as a needlessly abstract stab at the dynamic nature ofpersonality.
Kuppennan suggests that the study of character be expanded to include
axiology, i.e. the study of why (and what) people value. “[C]ontemporaiy ethical
philosophers make a sharp separation between the study of morality. . . and . . . axiology”
(ibid: 245). Axiology can determine why people do scemingly contradictory things;
perhaps those who failed to rebel in Milgram’s study had “a desire to fit in” (ibid: 247),
i.e. they valued conformity. However, Kupperman fails to note that psychologist study
axiology under the heading of motivation (e.g. Dcci & Flaste 1995).
I suspect Kupperman’s account would benefit from neuropsychological input, as
he seems to hold by dynamical approach to character, and one that includes axiology
(known to psychologists as motivation). Unfortunately, Kupperman, an advocate of the
narrative approach, finds most scientific psychology ‘uninteresting’ (sec Kupperman
1991).
69
4.3 Cognition and Virtue
Gopal Sreenivasan centres lis efforts on refuting Dons (199$, 2002) through a
refutation ofMischel (1968). In Sreenivasan’s view, both Mischel and Dons fail to
incorporate a wider view of CT that incorporates cognitive factors. In contrast,
Sreenivasan argues that what a subject thinks about their behaviour must play a role in
how researchers study it’8. Sreenivasan has accepted that “the debate about character
traits primarily concems the dimension of cross-situational consistency [ofbehaviour]”
(Srecnivasan 2001: 50). However, as noted in 1.4, cross-situationally stable behaviour is
flot actually required of complex systems.
$reenivasan notes that experiments have “operative definitions ofthe responses
and the situations being studied.. . fixcd or coded by the observer” (Sreenivasan 2001:
50). The standards set for what qualifies objective behaviour as, for example, ‘honest’
or ‘dishonest’ are determined before empirical evidence is collectcd. These standards
may be flawed, especially if they fail to incorporate cognitive factors. for example, an
experiment on politeness might rate a subject who fails to hold a door open for a
confederate with an armful ofbooks ‘impolite’. Later we determine that the subject’s
eyesight is impaired, or that in culture x helping someone with a door is considered
uncouth. The operational definition failed to capture cases where ‘failing to hold the
door’ was done for reasons other than ‘impoliteness’.
Therefore, Sreenivasan argues that the “failure to predict a person’s behaviour
on the basis of ‘objective’ bchavioural measures. . .is not always good evidence that the
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person’s behaviour is actually inconsistent across the situations in question”
(Sreenivasan 2001: 58). There may be cases where “the intention to mislead serves to
achieve a genuine good” (ibid: 60); e.g., a lie may be part ofa plan to surprise a friend
on their birthday.
b accommodate cognition in the assessment of behaviour, Sreenivasan
introduces three requirements needed to classify a character trait as a virtue:
(i) each behavioural measure must specify a response that represents a
central or paradigm case of what that trait requires;
(ii) the concrete situation each specifies must not have any features that
defeat the reason on account of which that trait requires the response
in question; and
(iii) the subject and the observer must agree on these characterizations of
the specified responses and situations (ibid: 6 1-62).
In terms ofoffering viable refinements to VE, I find Sreenivasan’s approach
unhelpful. His plans are at odds with existing psychological research (see 5.1); CI do
not appear to have ‘paradigm cases’. furthermore, it’s unclear what kind of ‘reasons’
would legitirnately defeat virtuous behaviour; if behaviour is generated within a
complex system (recall 1.4) then a myriad of ‘reasons’ to behave may exist in any
situation. On a meta-ethical note, Sreenivasan’s last criterion introduces a large- and I
would say undesirable- role for convention in morality. for example, a subject and
observer could agree that a particular behaviour is ‘kind’ (e.g. killing an animal in order
to retum its spirit to the realm of deities) and yet both could be incorrect.
18 lronically, Sreenivasan’s desire for cognitive variables coincides tvith Mischel’s (1968)! Mischel
helped to found a school of psychology known as ‘Social Cognitivism’ (see e.g., Williams & Cervone
1998) which advocatcs a cognitive approach to behavioural study.
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Sreenivasan confounds ‘moral behaviour’ with ‘behavioural consistency’, so
that social psychology’s threat to the latter is a threat to the former. This confusion
originates in a reading ofAristotie where traits are ‘robust’ (recail 1.1); i.e. virtues are
traits that lead to consistently expressed behaviour. Distinguishing virtues from CT is a
legitimate possibility in the Aristotelian account, where the role of CI is unclear. The
two methods ofbehavioural classification (i.e. moral vs. consistent) are distinct.
Virtuous behaviour is classified with moral terms (e.g. ‘honesty’) whereas consistency
uses descriptive similarity (e.g. ‘reading’). for example, a person who drives a car each
day has cross-situationally stable behaviour that is neither good nor bad. If a person
drives their car through a stoplight or into a pedestrian, or even regularly violates traffic
laws, their stable behaviour is unlikely to be classified as virtuous.
$reenivasan’s desire to refurbish VE with a more sophisticated psychology is
well intentioned but his attempt to do so outside of existing psychological research is
rnisguided.
The virtue ethicists succeed in showing that there is a case in favour of retaining
VE even in the light of social psychology. Athanassoulis notes that Aristotle’s account
is more complex than critics grant. Kupperman finds Harman’s depictions of ‘lay
views’ overly simple. Sreenivasan attempts to show that VE can survive reworking to
include cognitive factors. Yet each of these ethicists has offered only minor and
rnisguided reforms. I hope that all ofthese ethicists could appreciate a revised VE,
which preserves Aristotle’s intentions and yet updates his theory.
Chapter 5: Personality Psychology and Cognitive Neuroscience
Psychology is a heterogeneous field and character trait research has relied upon
various approaches. In general, this research has progressed from a linguistically
derived descriptive account of traits to one that integrates neuropsychoiogy. After a
review of the history of character trait research, findings derived from neuropsychology,
and relevant to moral psychoiogy, are presented.
5.1 A BriefHistory of Research on Character Traits
For some, “[t]he conternporary notion that the self can be objectively
investigated is the cuimination ofa very long and complicated historical proccss” (Gold
& Bacigalupe 199$: 75). Dominant theories are victors in a social power stmgglc,
gaining currency through persuasive promotion rather than intrinsic ment. Scientific
daims are “are only transforrned into knowledge by an acceptance process that involves
a number of individuals.
. .who share norms and interests” (Danzinger 1990: 180).
For others, an objective approacli to psychology was in place 2000 years ago
with Gaien, Aristotie, and progressing through Descartes, Pavlov, Broca, Penfield,
Hebb, and Sperry. For this group, scientific psychology weaves out of the philosophy of
mmd and into neuroscience and medicine, only to reunite in cognitive neuroscience of
the 20th century. The field ofpsychology is undeniably heterogeneous; yet, this does
not mean that ail approaches work equaily weIl. I attempt to present the variety found
within psychologicai research on CT in what foilows and seek to identify successful
rnethods.
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Early pcrsonality theories were linkcd to physiology. Hippocrates posited that
sickness arosc from imbalance in the body and Galen that imbalances in the four bodily
humours caused personality differences called temperarnents. An excess ofblood lcd to
a sanguine (cheerful) temperarnent, phlegm to phiegmatic (cairn), yeilow bile to
choleric (aggressive), and black bile to melancholic (depressive). These four paradigm
personality types formed a circumplex (a compass configuration) where the cardinal
points and their intermediates define temperarnents with physiological correlates.
Aristotelian psychology, stressing both vegetal and rational aspects (recail 11),
was interpreted within theology to ernphasise (divinely inspired) hurnan reason over the
psychological properties possessed by animais. This approach was forrnalised in the
dualism of Descartes (Descartes 1991 [1637]). Rational functions ofthe mmd were
more important, and more certain, than the existence of the world. Descartes’ view has
long dominated the philosophy ofrnind, leading to a near exclusive exarnination of
function (e.g. thinking) over rnechanism (e.g. die biological processes that underlie
thought)’9. At this point, it is convenient, although overly simplistic, to bifurcate the
histoiy of psychology. I wiil present an account of character that traces the functional
approach and then rcturn to detail a neuroscientific account.
The late 19th century saw William Wundt establish the first university
psychology department, heralding the birth of ‘psychoiogy’ as a field distinct from the
traditional philosophy of mmd. Personality psychology emerged in the 20th cenmry
with the publishing of Personality (1937) by Gordon Aliport- the younger brother of
social psychoiogist Floyd Ailport (sec 2.1). The field ofpersonality was a conceptual
‘ Descartes’ Iegacy is unfortunate; evidence suggests that he withdrew a physiological account of the
mmd in fear of religious persecution and offered a philosophical account instcad (Leahey 2000).
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mess, incorporating millennia ofphilosophy and decades ofpsychology. Allport
advanced a two-part ‘lexical hypothesis’ to organise the clutter. Firstly, he postulated
that the terms required to describe personality are found in natural languages. Secondly,
he supposed that these words capture a limited number of personality variables.
Aliport and his colleagues collccted over 18,000 terms from the English
language: 4,500 ofthese described ‘character’. ‘Character traits’ were limited to
individual differences (e.g. excitable, lethargic) as opposed to talents, temporary mood
states, physical characteristics etc. A near exclusive focus on ‘individual difference’
terms contravened Allport’s initial desire that psychologists “regard the human
personality.. .as centred in the organism” (Ailport 1960: 20).
The huge task oforganising trait adjectives vas greatly bolstered by factor
anatysis, a statistical approach championed by Raymond Catteil. factor analysis
converts masses of data into manageable clusters by extracting the variables that
underpin data. for example, in a study ofdepression, we might rate mood in variable
settings: in the snow, in the ram, in hait, on sunny days, and indoors at various
illuminations. Canying out a factor anatysis finds that two factors underlie reports of
strong moods: precipitation and lighting.
Using factor analysis, Catteli found 35, later revised to 12, personality factors.
The appropriate number of factors resuits in part from the number of times factor
analysis is performed. The problem is that how rnany tirnes factor analysis should be
perforrned is unclear from a mathematical perspective alone; it requires theoretical
justification. Factor analysis without a robust theory risks illusory accuracy; i.e., factor
analysis looks precise even when incorrect. Critics ofthe exclusive reliance on factor
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analysis note that is a technique, flot a decision procedure (Block 1995), and cannot
resolve the appropriate number of factors unaided by theory (Eysenck 1992).
The theoretical interpretation of personality factors remains primitive.
Personality factors are ‘super-clusters’ ofthe more specific trait descriptions used to
compile them (e.g. Costa & McCrae 1998, John & Srivastava 1999). In other words, the
role that CT play within an individual, as opposed to between individuals, is unknown.
This situation is perhaps analogous to Aristotle’s use ofCT (recall 1.1).
The lexical hypothesis resembles the Wittgensteinian ‘linguistic toolbox’ for its
reliance on lay terms. Also ofphilosophical import is its framing of character in a
Western language, i.e., English. Certain languages, i.e., non Indo-European ones, may
have views of character that would lead to new personality variables. However, the
lexical approach is merely a springboard to scientific rcsearch; language describes,
rather than explains, character. This taxonomy is perhaps akin to biology’s birth in
naturalist observations (Saucier & Goldberg 1996).
Nonetheless, the lexical project persevcres; psychologists have investigated
Dutch, German, Chinese (see the review in John & Srivastava 1999) and Japanese
(Murakami 2002). The study ofpersonality through questionnaires keeps lexical work
prominent; questionnaires require translation for international use. Furthermore,
personality questionnaires are used in personnel evaluation and employment
counselling.
Some researchers have supplernented the lexical approach with a correlational
hypothesis. If existing personality questionnaires measure a limited number of
personality traits, then correlations between these questionnaires will uncover traits.
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However, this program cannot integrate the research ofpersonality theorists who do not
use traits (Williams & Cewone 1998).
Efforts have converged on a five-factor model (FFM): colloquially known as
‘The Big Five’. The five traits are (I) ExtraversionlSurgency, (II) Agrecableness, (III)
Conscientiousness, (W) Neuroticism, and (V) Openness to Experience/Intellect. The
various names assigned to each trait reflect that ‘the model’ is actually a collection of
models; appropriate trait names are somewhat arbitrary.
According to the FFM, CT have poles (e.g. Extraversion is bounded by extreme
extraversion and extreme introversion) and each trait is normatively distributed
throughout the human population. “About 38% ofthe population will lie within the
average range; another 24% each will be in the high and tow ranges, and about 7% will
be in the vely high and the vely tow ranges” (Costa & McCrae 1998: 104-105). Finally,
traits are hypothesised to be orthogonal, so that having a particular score in onc trait is
not conelated to a particular score in another.
Characteristics of a high-score on a trait are described with adjectives such as:
1) Extraversion: warrnth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, exciternent seeking
2) Agreeableness: trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, rnodesty, tender
mindedness
3) Conscientiousness: competence, order, dutifulness, achievernent striving, self
discipline, deliberation
4) Neuroticism: anxiety, hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness,
vulnerability
5) Openness: fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, ideas, values
(Adapted from McCrae & John 1992: 178-179)
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In their ‘pure forms’, i.e. high-scores on traits, some ffM traits, especially
Agreeableness, resemble virales (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson 2000). Yet as compelling
as the five-factor descriptions are, I think that it is too soon to effect a one-to-one
translation ftom trait to virtue. FFM advocates daim that “every aspect ofindividual
differences in personality is related to one (or sometimes more) of these five factors”
(Costa & McCrae 1998: 107), yet the fFM provides sparse insight into the personality
of individuals. fFM traits are conceptual properties emerging from group data that
capture differences between individuals, i.e., as compared to one another (John &
Srivastava 1999). FfM traits do not explain the significance of these differences in the
individual. The FfM also lacks an account ofthe systematic organisation of traits
within individuals, i.e. an account ofthe functioning ofseveral traits in a personality
system and their rote in behaviour.
Theories with a high degree ofgeneratity and littie specificity (i.e. purport to
explain everything while stating liffle) are either proto- or pseudo-sciences (Bunge &
Ardila 1 987). To the extent that the FFM is uncriticalty applied, I would label it a
pseudoscience; however, certain trends tead me to believe that it is on the path to
becoming part ofa mature science. While many FfM daims are unsurprising; e.g.,
extraverts are by definition warm and gfegarious, the FFM has begun to make
unintuitive daims as it is linked to neuroscience. for example, extraversion is conelated
with positive affect (Watson & Ctark 1997) and may correlate to individual differences
in the reward-centres in the brain (Lucas et al. 2000).
The attempt to link fFM to neuroscience actually follows an cartier effort
focussing on arousal levels in the nervous systems of extraverts and introverts. A
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notable finding is that introverts are more sensitive to low and medium levels of
stimulation than extraverts; introvcrts’ brains are more active at Iower levels of
stimulation (Zuckerman 199$).
Efforts to integrate the remaining FFM traits into neuropsychology may signal a
shift to the explanation of the role of CT within individual personality rather than mere
description of individual differences (Eysenck 1997, Stelmack 1997). As this research
progresses, some formerly optimistic FFM advocates have tempered their support and
wonder if character traits capture only two-traits (Digman 1997). In a two-trait model,
one trait is related to reward structures, i.e. how a person responds to reward stimuli;
this subsumes Extraversion and Openness. Another trait would be linked to ernotional
reactivity, subsuming Agreeableness, Neuroticism, and Conscientiousncss. Research
interests are gradually shifting away from CT and towards the “subcornponent neural
processes that determine ... traits” (Grigsby & Stevens 2000: 189).
5.2 Moral Psychology and the Brain
Neuroscientific psychology has progressed slowly and quietly. There are a few
reasons for neurosciencc’s operation ‘under the radar’. Firstly, rnany characteristics of
the brain, such as its location inside the skull and its lack of ‘moving parts’, renders
post-mortem anatomical studies relatively easy, but physiotogical studies (i.e. of
function) quite difficult. Even today, knowledge ofthe ftmction of specific brain
regions remains relatively low (Kingsley 2000). While general functions have been
altocated to general areas (e.g. a region found to control many aspects of auditory
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processing is dubbed the ‘auditoiy cortex’), research on the specific mechanisms of
each area is slow to appear.
furthermore, direct brain experimentation on humans is both difficuit and
unethical; manipulation of the brain can easily resuit in massive cognitive deficits,
personality alteration, or death. Animal studies (e.g. using primates and rats),
emergency surgery, and ‘natural experiment’ (i.e. where disease or accident damage the
brain) stand in for direct experimentation. Comparative anatomy (e.g. between other
mammals and humans) is straightforward for certain brain regions but difficult to apply
to others. For example, what are neuroscientists to make ofhumans, compared to other
primates, substantially enlarged frontal lobes? Accidents and surgery are subject to
happenstance, imprecision, and provide only a limited sample of subjects. Only
recently, beginning approximately in the 1 980s, have advances in imaging technology
permitted non-invasive in vivo observation of the brain (sec e.g., Katz & Grinvald
2002).
With the discovery ofbrain regions linked to speech, rage, and voluntary
decision-making, neuroscience began to reattach itself to the study of cognitive
functions. The result ofthis ‘fusion’ is called cognitive ne;troscience20. I’ll note two
neuroscientific principles that I suspect are relevant to moral psychology. F irstly,
although ‘mental functions’ (i.e. the processes of neural-systems) are distributed
throughout the brain, these processes converge on ‘hubs’, i.e. the brain is ‘weakly
modular’. Neuropsychologists focus on brain areas that are especially active during
20 I have glossed over the role of cognitive science (i.e. computational models of the mind/brain) in
cognitive neuroscience; the latter originates in ‘pre-computational’ work (e.g. Hebb [1949] 2002).
Whatever the role of cognitive science in deveoping neuroscience, none would deny the usefulness of
$0
certain functions; it is, however, incorrect to say that a particular brain function is
isoÏated to a particular area.
The corollary is that certain brain areas may be particularly relevant to moral
behaviour. One such area is the pre-frontal cortex. People with pre-frontal cortex
damage may have relatively unimpaired intellectual abilities, yet show massive deficits
in their social behaviour and a marked lack of compassion towards others (Anderson et
al. 1999, Dolan 1999).
A second point of interest to moral psychology is that the brain is (roughly)
divided into autonomic and voluntary functional regions. The Autonomic Nervous
System controls and co-ordinates involuntaiy functions such as organ function (e.g.
speeding up heart rate with the perception of fearful stimuli) and reflexes (e.g. eye
blinking). Many autonomic functions, such as sexual response, also have a voluntary
aspect (Kingsley 2000). It seems probable that CT characterise the autonomic newous
system rather than the voluntary system, although the hue between the two is cuide.
For example, whether a stimulus is rewarding is determined by non-voluntary systems;
yet this can be ‘re-interpreted’ by voluntary effort over time (Grigsby & Stevens 2000).
Conversely, an involuntary reaction may becorne part of person’s voluntary decision
making. For example, a person who reacts negatively to novel social stimuli may
generally choose to avoid them, e.g. purposefully avoiding crowds (Kagan 1994).
Voluntary action is controlled to the forebrain, although many voluntary
functions, e.g. co-ordinating speech, are soon relegated to ‘habit’, i.e. no longer require
conscious control. Aristotle’s stress on the importance of correct habit formation was a
computational models despite certain limitations (e.g., the failure to examine emotions, Kosslyn &
Kocnig 1995).
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good one; in general, only unusual circumstances (e.g. leaming a new language, the loss
of a spouse) wilI force us to unearth and releam our habits. Whereas most ethicists
exclusively emphasise the voluntary aspect of moral behaviour, i.e. rational thought and
planning, I see part ofAristotle’s legacy as stressing the important role ofautonomic
systems and habit.
Behavioural generation involves voluntary and involuntaiy systems that,
roughly stated, include a person and an environment. Environmental stimuli and the
cunent state ofthe brain (e.g. leaming, arousal, mcmory) feedback on each other to
create a ‘situation’. Therefore, a situation is a system, i.e. an interrelation ofneural,
physiological and environmental conditions, rather than a mere aggregate, i.e., a
collection of environmental stimuli with a person standing in the middle.
Within neuropsychology, a one-to-one relation between a particular
psychological component (e.g. character) and behaviour disappears and is replaced by a
systems view. Unfortunately, thcre are yet no comprehensive theories ofbehavioural
generation, although rnany are trying to develop them (e.g. Block 2002, Cisek 2001).
for the time being, rule-of-thumb generalisations are probably better predictors of the
behaviour ofspecific individuals, e.g., Ben ate tuna today, and he’Il probably cat tuna
tomonow. However, neuropsychology provides predictions that ‘lay systems’ cannot
offer, e.g., that a person with pre-frontal lesions will display irresponsible behaviour.
More significantly, cognitive neuroscience de-stigmatises people who display
certain maladaptive behavioural patterns, even as the behavioural pattems continue to
be seen as maladaptive. In my work tutoring leaniing disabled students, I met teenagers
derided as ‘slow’, ‘stupid’, or ‘lazy’. Some of these teenagers actually had locaÏised
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neurological deficits that impeded their ability to, for example, understand speech or
read sentences. Likewise, people usually seen as ‘bad’ may actually have deficits in
particular neurological areas. Cognitive neuroscience provides the precision to examine
the systems that generate and mediate behaviour; some behavioural probiems may have
an isolated neurological origin. Unrecognised local deficits may ‘avalanche’ into global
problems; for example, a child with poor eye-site may appear intellectually slow, when
ail they need to behave normally is glasses. Identifying these deficits is especially
important in the case ofyoung children, whose brain ofien have the plasticity needed to
develop nonnally if initial effort is made to accommodate deficits (Kagan 1994).
Tcchnology derived from neuroscience may allow the treatment of aduits and
their reintegration into society. Unfortunately, our society scems to moving towards an
exclusive use of chemical (i.e. pharmaceutical) teclmology as a means to overcome
psychological deficits. However, educational technology and the redesign of social
systems can also promotc psychological health. Educational and management
technology focus and changing both people and social systems.
What is wonisome about phamaceutical technology is that it leaves existing
social structures unexamined and unimproved. If being subject to an authoritarian
decision-making processes in the workplace (i.e. at the bottom ofa top-down
organisational structure) brings on depression, treatment of this depression with
medication leaves the organisational structure unchanged. If post-traumatic stress
disorder in soldiers is brought on when they witness, or commit, brutal atrocities, is the
best course of action pharmacological treatment, e.g. erasing stress with drugs, or
prevention, i.e. peace?
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Recali (from the introduction) that moral principles have a place in directing
technology, tacitly or explicitly. In the case ofpharmaceuticals, I fear that the moral
principle is tacit and flawed (e.g. ‘your duty is to work efficiently no matter the
conditions’). In any case, overcoming neurological problems may help people
reintegrate into society and live good lives; this is well within the mandate of a
humanist ethics.
Modem psychology preserves important features of Aristotelian psychology.
The importance of education in mediating character, such as in the development of CT
such as introversion and the formation of habits, i.e. procedural leaming, are preserved.
Voluntary behaviour, mediated by the frontal lobes, also plays a crucial role in moral
behaviour.
If virtue is flot, and perhaps neyer was, rnerely a chai-acter trait, what is it? In
concluding, I offer a few speculations.
Conclusion: Research Programs and Applications for Virtue Ethics
In the hands of virtue ethicists, VE has remained divorccd from revision. In the
hands ofzealous reformers, VE is rejected entirely. I have sympathy for both camps. I
applaud the critics of VE for attempting to integrate psychology into ethics, while I
support the vit-tue ethicists for conserving a fruitful ethical theory. Whether any ofthese
ethicists would accept the modifications to VE that I have presented is an open question.
Social psychology should serve as motivation for virtue ethicists both to
understand human moral psychology and to apply their moral theory; authority, and
even simple hurry, can cause people to behave poorly. Personality psychology -linked
to neuropsychology- should help virtue ethicists to achieve both goals.
I propose that virtues are best conceived of as emergent properties of humans in
social systems (i.e. virtues are processes, flot things). This reformulation is in one sense
unsurprising. Aristotle makes it clear that virtues form from biological properties
moulded by education. Furthermore, rnany ethicists have noted that societal factors
must play a foie lfl virtue (e.g. Hursthouse 1999, Merriif 2000). An extremely important
factor for virtue is the quality of education that chiidren receive (e.g. Nussbaum 1990).
However, the emergent account, in stipulating that virtues are properties of
dynamic systems, clears up some mysteries, namely the relation of virtues to CT. Many
virtue theorists assume that CT (and virtues) are static traits that indicate a property that
people ‘possess’ (e.g. Dons 2002, Harman 1999a, Kupperman 2001, Sreenivasan 2001).
Only from a static point ofview can CT be ‘robust’, i.e. consistently expressed21. In the
21 Some accept this view of CT even as they find h an implausible; Kupperman notes that “traits.. .cannot
be the whole truth. . [they leave us] the problem of the fluidity of self’ (2001: 24$-249).
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static approach, virtue is like mass; it is a property that defines a person as long as they
exist. A static trait should express itselfbehaviourally in a reliable fashion, perhaps
mediated by surrounding conditions as mass is by gravity (i.e. to form ‘weight’). The
expression of virtue could be weakened by ‘situational gravity’, yet the property neyer
disappears.
In contrast, I see virtue like health; it is an emergent property that depends on
processes within a thing. The primary difference between static and dynamic versions of
vii-tue is that in the latter, virtue only appears during certain processes, whereas in the
former, a person either has virtue or they do not22. If virtues are dynamic, they can
appear robust (i.e. the property often expresses itself) but cannot be robust (i.e. the
emergence of the property is conditional on the operation of other systems).
Interestingly, the initiator ofthe character debate, Flanagan (1991), dissents from the
‘robust’ view of CT and virtue, although he fails to provide a clear alternative.
In hurnans health requires processes that underlie ‘life’ and ‘consciousness’.
What does virtue require? Aristotle gives us some dues: voluntary action (i.e. do
ordinated by processes within the pre-frontal cortex), perception, habit and knowledge
(i.e., procedural knowledge and declarative knowledge), emotions. Perhaps ail of the
systems are required for virtue, perhaps only some. Tentatively, it seems uniikely that
people with severely damaged pre-frontal coi-Lices have much hope of vii-tue; although
whether such people are ‘vicious’ is another question.
An interesting corollary of a dynamic approach is that if habit and learning are
major parts ofvirtuous behaviour then as human learning progresses (i.e. people
22 Hursthouse daims that it may be plausible to conceive of possessing virtue in gradients, such as ‘fairly
virtuous’ or ‘nearly virtuous’ (Hursthouse 1999).
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discover new things) we discover situations in which few people can be expected to
behave virtuously- because no one knows how. In other words, dynamic VE indicates
the possibility of moral leaming in individuals and moral progress in societies
(Churchiand 199$). Adhering to VE may oblige a person to become an amateur
scientist, i.e. to leam about the world in order to act well within it. In stating that
virtuous people seek excellence, Aristotie seems to have had this in mmd.
In ils neo-Aristotelian formulation, the application of VE is guided by the
question “Who should I be?” Applied virtue ethics can involve reflection on what a
virtuous person would characteristically do in a situation, emulating virtuous people, or
actually secking out the help ofvirtuous people (Hursthouse 1999). In other words, VE
is applied through seif-reflection and peer guidance and is aimed at one’s own person;
VE lias few roles to play in institutions or society.
A revised VE is applied with questions such as “What allows virtuous
behaviour?” and “What prevents virtuous behaviour?”. Ethicists and social scicntists
co-operate to discover the biological, psychological, and social properties that allow, or
prevent, the emergence of virtue. Virtue ethics is directed towards others and through
society. for example, if virtue emcrges from basic health (e.g. adequate nourishment
and shelter) then virtue ethicists put a prime on ensuring that basic health needs are met
through social policy, i.e., political reforrn.
Biologicatly, a person’s constitution may make it difflcult, even impossible, for
them to act welI, e.g., someone who is paralysed or blind. Virtue ethicists seek to allow
disabled people to act wcll (e.g. promoting surgery, mechanical aids), to change societal
attitudes to be accepting of disabled people (e.g. to convince firms to hire disabled
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people to allow them the opportunity to take on rights and responsibilities, and to
behave morally, rather than remaining isolated). Temporaiy biological states may also
impede virtue; for example, extreme hunger might activate the autonomic nervous
system and exciude a large place for voluntary control of behaviour. Aristotie
recognised that there are “things terrible even beyond human strength” (EN 111 5b: 7-
8)- whereby ‘preventative virtue ethics’ would seek to prevent terrible occurrences (e.g.
prevent famine, accidents, war).
Ethicists could also work in medical settings as ‘preventative ethicists’, sceking
to prevent disorders and syndromes that block good behaviour. An example of such a
syndrome- and one whose prevention is well within our reach- is foetal Alcohol
Syndrome. This syndrome develops in chiidren whose mothers consume alcohol during
pregnancy; it is a leading cause of mental retardation in chiidren and linked to
criminality (Davison & Neale 1997). Ethicists’ task is to work to educate mothers on
the dangers of consuming alcohol during pregnancy.
In educational psychology, VE promotes the importance of ‘intemalising’ moral
habits as procedural knowledge. This could involve teaching people how to be ethical
through role-playing. A second area of interest is avoiding pattems of leaming, e.g.
illiteracy, that make virtue behaviour extremely difficuit to manifest in modem society.
A third area of interest is therapy, whereby habits that prevent virtuous action (e.g.
anxiety or phobias) are reduced. For example, an ‘introvert’ might function weIl under
low-stimulus conditions (e.g. in a Iibrary) but incontinently under a higli degree of
stimulation (e.g. the emergency room).
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In society, ethicists and engineers could co-operate to promote ‘flourishing
projects’, such as repairing sewer systems, and decline frivolous ones, such as the
design of sports utility vehicles. Whereas human flourishing manifests amidst an
educated populace, a peaceful society, and clean water, VE is intimately linked to
individual, societal and enviromnental issues. Virtue is an emergent property based on
biological, psychological, and social processes. Researchers identify these processes
and work with technoÏogists to modify biological, psychological, and social systems in
order to increase the likelihood of the emergence of virtuous behaviour.
Looking forward is crucial for ethics; ethics guides our gaze, our plans, and our
future. An ethics deprived of science sees little. Ethicists must take their place on the
shoulders of giants.
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